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My dissertation addresses neglected roles of idealization and abstraction in scientific modeling. 
Current debates about epistemic issues in modeling presuppose that a model in question 
uncontroversially represents a particular target system. A standard line of argument is that we can 
gain knowledge of a target system simply by noting what aspects of the target are veridically 
represented in the model. But this misses epistemically important aspects of modeling. I examine 
how scientists identify certain phenomena as target systems in their models. Building on the 
distinction between data and phenomena introduced by Bogen and Woodward, I analyze how 
scientists target systems from data and from basic theoretical principles. I show that there are two 
crucial empirical assumptions that are involved in identifying phenomena. These assumptions 
concern the conditions under which phenomena can be indexed to a particular length or time scale 
and the conditions under which one can treat phenomena occurring at different length or time 
scales as distinct. The role of these assumptions in modeling provides the basis for a new argument 
that shows how, in many cases, idealizations and abstractions in models are essential for providing 
knowledge about the world in so far as they isolate relevant components of a phenomenon from 
irrelevant ones. My analysis of the identification of phenomena also shows that structural 
 v 
uncertainty arises in models when the scale of a phenomenon of interest is not properly identified. 
This clarification promises to improve the communication of the limitation of current climate 
models to policy makers. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Giere (1988), Cartwright (1999), Morrison and Morgan (1999), Wimsatt (2007), Pincock (2012), 
Weisberg (2013) have focused on the following question: Given that models are false of the world, 
how can they produce reliable knowledge? More specifically, how can models that necessarily 
idealize or abstract from their target systems provide reliable information about these systems? 
Attempts to answer this question usually focus on trying to establish a certain kind of relation 
between the model and the target system. A standard line of argument is that we can gain 
knowledge of a target system simply by noting what aspects of the target are veridically 
represented in the model. For example, early responses to the issue of idealization and abstraction 
relied on the notion of “Galilean Idealization” (McMullin 1985, Laymon 1985), according to 
which an idealization is initially introduced in the model but can be subsequently dispensed with, 
when more detailed models are constructed. 1 Some philosophers, especially Batterman (2009), 
have resisted this view of idealization and have argued that idealizations are in many cases 
indispensable for models to provide knowledge. Weisberg (2013) suggests that there are several 
non-competing ways in which idealizations are epistemically useful. 
                                                 
1 McMullin’s definition of idealization includes any simplification of something complicated 
(1985, 248), so it includes what has been more recently called idealization and abstraction (Jones 
2005).  
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My dissertation is inspired, in part, by a lacuna in the literature on the role of idealization 
and abstraction in scientific modeling described above. Current debates about epistemic issues in 
modeling usually assumes that what the model is a model of is uncontroversial, or that it is beyond 
the scope of philosophical analysis. One consequence of the assumption that what a model is a 
model of is uncontroversial is that abstractions and idealizations are analyzed as constituent parts 
of the model that either are essential or subsequently need to be removed. My work takes a 
radically different approach, as the standard line misses important aspects of the epistemic role of 
modeling. I examine the processes by which phenomena are identified as targets.   
Building on the distinction between data and phenomena introduced by Bogen and 
Woodward (1988), I discuss the details of how scientists identify relevant aspects of the world to 
be modeled both from data and from basic theoretical principles. My approach analyzes 
abstractions and idealizations as assumptions that are part of the process by which scientists obtain 
models of phenomena. Here, phenomena are stable, recurrent features of the world. By taking this 
different approach, I can explore the role of the assumptions that are crucial for identifying targets 
as phenomena and highlight the epistemic and ontological implications of these assumptions. I 
show that there are two crucial empirical assumptions that are involved in identifying phenomena. 
These assumptions concern the conditions under which these phenomena can be indexed to a 
particular length and time scale, and the conditions under which one can treat phenomena 
occurring at different length or time scales as distinct. The role of these assumptions in modeling 
provides the basis for a new argument that shows how, in many cases, idealizations and 
abstractions in models are essential for providing knowledge about the world in so far as they 
isolate relevant components of a phenomenon from irrelevant ones.  
 3 
My analysis of the role of scale related assumptions in the context of identifying 
phenomena also allows me to clarify a concept that is part of the growing philosophical literature 
on epistemic issues in climate science. This is the concept of structural uncertainty. Typically, this 
is considered to be uncertainty about the structure of the equations that represent the climate.2 
Current philosophical analyses have identified an important problem, but they miss some 
important points. For example, they also do not consider the issue of identifying target systems, 
and as such their accounts cannot help in the mitigation of structural uncertainty; nor can they 
provide for clear demonstrations of the limitations of current climate models to policy makers. My 
analysis of the identification of phenomena removes some of this problematic vagueness. I show 
that one way in which structural uncertainty arises in models is when the scale of a phenomenon 
of interest is not properly identified. The scale related assumptions are in fact a tool for determining 
what components are relevant for adequately identifying and modeling phenomena of interest. 
Failure to properly use this tool introduces uncertainty in whether scientists are adequately 
identifying and modeling these phenomena. This characterization provides a way to individuate 
where and to what degree structural uncertainty is tied to misidentification of the scales at which 
phenomena are present. The analysis also provides insight into how to mitigate against structural 
uncertainty. 
One of the most important aspects of target identification in science is the use of scales. 
Scales are understood as spatiotemporal scales, and these are fundamental for the definition of 
physical system. As Emanuel says, “A system must somehow be distinct in space and time and the 
transfer of physically relevant quantities across the boundaries of the system must be understood” 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Parker (2006, 2010, 2011), Frigg et al. (2013, 2014), Stainforth, Allen, et al. 
(2007), Knutti (2008). 
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(Emanuel 1986, 6). However straightforward and obvious this statement might sound, it hides both 
ontological and epistemic subtleties in the atmospheric and climate sciences, and in science in 
general. Like climate scientists, population ecologists also recognize the difficulty of finding target 
systems, and the role that spatiotemporal scales play in identifying them. Finding the 
spatiotemporal scale at which recurring features can be observed is conducive to successful model 
building (whatever the purpose) (Levin 1992). Individuating the scales at which phenomena occur 
and modeling the dynamics of the phenomenon with the relevant variables and parameters is a 
central yet difficult enterprise in meteorology (Emanuel 1986).   
Three different examples of the problem of scale for modeling phenomena illustrate the 
importance of this issue. These examples are derived from population biology (Levin 1992), 
oceanography (Stommel 1963), atmospheric science (Emanuel 1986), and show different but 
overlapping aspects of the problem of scale. The examples I provide raise important themes that 
will be discussed in this dissertation. These themes are the problem of identification of target 
systems, the assumptions used to identify the targets, their nature, and the role of spatiotemporal 
scales. In the rest of this chapter, I will briefly discuss the examples to show the centrality of the 
problem of scale. 
1.1 ECOLOGY 
Levin (1992) says: 
Our efforts to develop theories of the way ecosystems or communities are organized 
must revolve around attempts to discover patterns that can be quantified within 
systems and compared across systems. (Levin 1992, 1947) 
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Levin’s point is that quantitatively precise descriptions of systems must capture the patterns within 
the systems of interest. Different systems will be described in terms of different patterns. The 
variables that represent physical parameters of interest quantify these patterns and define the target 
system. The physical parameters of interest are organized in terms of spatiotemporal scales. The 
difficulty is the quantification of the variability––the frequency and amplitude of a pattern in a 
data series––of a physical quantity. Quantifying the variability, in this case, involves identifying 
the aspects of the data series that are associated with the system. One important step in identifying 
these aspects is to find the relevant scale as a system, and to determine how the system interacts 
with other scales across its boundaries.  
 
 
Figure 1.1. Spatial and temporal scales of zooplankton biomass variability. Reprinted with permission from 
Springer Customer Service Centre GmbH: Springer Nature, Patterns and Processes in the Time-Space Scales of 
Plankton Distributions, Haury et al., © (1978). 
 
 Figure 1.1 shows how a physical quantity of interest for population ecologists––biomass 
variability––organizes in space and time. Even if the biomass of plankton can have small variations 
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at all scales, there are clear peaks in the graph at the characteristic spatiotemporal scale of processes 
of interest. The challenges in modeling these processes lie in having an observation network that 
accurately collects data series at regular spatial and temporal intervals and building a mathematical 
model that accurately represents the relevant parameters for the processes. 
Levin recognizes that characterizations of phenomena are limited by our observational 
capabilities. He suggests that “our perception of events provides us with only a low-dimensional 
slice through a high-dimensional cake” (Levin 1992, 1945), where the “perception” is organized 
in space and time. Spatiotemporal scales are “imposed on us by our perceptual capabilities, or by 
technological or logistical constraints” (Levin 1992, 1945). Perceptual capabilities are aided by 
instruments, such as observational networks and the methods used to extract the relevant signal 
from the observations (such as Fourier analysis). These capabilities, however, can be compromised 
by lack of technology or lack of good strategies for setting up effective networks.  
Levin also recognizes that the resolution of the variability of a system of interest depends 
on the scale at which the system is observed (Levin 1992, 1945). This dependency implies that a 
system and its dynamics can be described successfully if the right spatiotemporal scale at which 
the variability drives the system is recognized. The variability of the system can be thought in 
terms of its dynamics, i.e. those quantities that are part of the system that change in time. Which 
parameter is relevant (kinetic energy, biomass variability, etc.) depends in part on the modeling 
aims of the scientist.3 Nevertheless, Levin claims that for any variability of interest, there is going 
to be a spatiotemporal scale at which variables and parameters can describe the relevant drivers of 
the variability: 
                                                 
3 There are both empirical and normative considerations that are taken into account when 
identifying target systems. I discuss these issues in chapter 2. 
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This is the principal technique of scientific inquiry: by changing the scale of 
description, we move from unpredictable, unrepeatable individual cases to 
collections of cases whose behavior is regular enough to allow generalizations to 
be made. (Levin 1992, 1947) 
Levin sees a close connection between successful modeling and finding regularities at different 
scales such that they can be predicted and applied to similar instances. The technological and 
logistical constraints just mentioned limit the ability to recognize such scales. 
Levin’s view can be summarized as follows. There are recurrent patterns that can be 
recognized at different spatiotemporal scales. These are what scientists can identify as systems or 
phenomena. Modeling strategies must capture these patterns at the right scale, in order to quantify 
the variability (dynamics) so that predictions can be made and describe the dynamics so that the 
general physics (or biology) of it can be understood. 
The ecologist Holling provides another example of the importance of scale for the 
definition of physical system: 
All terrestrial ecosystems are controlled and organized by a small set of key plant, 
animal, and abiotic processes. They form interacting clusters of relationships, each 
of which determines the temporal and spatial structure over a constrained range of 
scales. The overall extent of these influences covers at least centimeters to hundreds 
of kilometers in space and months to centuries in time. (Holling 1992, 451) 
Holling claims that we observe patterns that arise in ecosystems. These patterns arise at 
characteristic spatiotemporal scales, at which we can identify key interacting relationships (in 
Holling’s case control and organization of the components).  
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1.2 OCEANOGRAPHY 
In a landmark paper published in 1963, the oceanographer Henry Stommel discusses the 
importance of an organized and systematic network of observations for studying ocean dynamics. 
He claims that different grid sizes of observation networks are needed to detect different 
phenomena. Stommel writes: 
[A] single net does not catch fish of all sizes; the existing net of tide-gauge stations 
does not suffice for a study of turbulence. It is necessary to decide which part of 
the spectrum of each variable one wants to measure. … Each plan must provide a 
definite significance level within a limited part of the spectrum despite 
contamination from other parts of the spectrum. (Stommel 1963, 573; my 
emphasis) 
There are several important points. Grids of observational networks of different sizes are needed 
for observing different phenomena. Certain phenomena, such as turbulence, need a finer net, as it 
is a process that occurs on small to large spatiotemporal scales. The fact that processes occur at 
different spatiotemporal scales implies that different observational networks can and do detect 
stable recurring signals at many different scales, despite the fact that all scales are connected to 
each other.  
The difficulty that both the observational scientist and the modeler need to take into 
account is the following. The network of observation stations needs to be on a grid size that allows 
for a spectrum that actually detects the signal of processes occurring at the scale of the grid size. 
Subsequently one needs to be able to detect the signal of the process in the time series of data 
collected by the net.  
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These points have both ontological and epistemic consequences. The first point is 
ontological: phenomena are characterized as existing at different spatiotemporal scales. The 
epistemic consequences are that observational networks need to have different grid sizes in order 
to be able to detect different phenomena, and that even at the relevant scale for a certain 
phenomenon, the signal from the quantity of interest that is measured needs to be distinguished 
from the noise coming from phenomena at other scales. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Spatiotemporal scales of processes occurring on the ocean surface. From Stommel (1963). Reprinted 
with permission from AAS. 
 
Figure 1.2 provides an intuitive visualization of Stommel’s points. In the graph, the two 
horizontal axes are space and time, while the vertical axis represents energy. The graph shows 
peaks of kinetic energy at different spatiotemporal scales, and these peaks represent different 
processes. Tides, for example, are processes that can be detected at temporal scales just above the 
hour and just below a day, and on spatial scales between one and one thousand kilometers. This 
means that an observational network that extends above these scales is not going to capture this 
 10 
phenomenon, and neither will an observational network that detects changes in movements of the 
ocean below one hour and on spatial scales below the kilometer.  
Further, note that the graph has lines that connects the energy peaks, meaning that these 
peaks are interconnected. This implies that there is always going to be some interaction among the 
scales at which peaks are found, and the difficulty in building a successful model is two-fold. First, 
at the scale at which phenomena can be detected, one needs to distinguish between the variables 
that are relevant for the recurrence of the phenomenon of interest, and the noise from other scales 
needs to be left out. Second, the modeler also needs to be aware of interactions across scales, as 
these might sometimes be important for the dynamics of a model that intends to include different 
scales of motion. 
1.3 ATMOSPHERIC DYNAMICS 
While Stommel provides a primarily data-driven account of the importance of spatiotemporal 
scales in modeling, the atmospheric scientist Emanuel provides a general perspective on the 
problem of scales in meteorology.  
As mentioned above, the location of a system in space and time, and the understanding of 
the variables that are relevant for the conservation within and the transfer across the system’s 
boundaries is fundamental for the recognition and definition of a target system. The location of a 
target system is at the heart of the modeling practice, and it presents many challenges, some of 
which we have seen in the previous subsections. The atmosphere is a particularly interesting case 
study, as it is modeled as a fluid the energy spectrum of which is “smooth and continuous between 
the limits imposed by the mean free path of molecules on the short scale and the circumference of 
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the earth on the large” (Emanuel 1986, 1). Nevertheless, phenomena such as cumulus clouds, 
hurricanes, weather fronts et cetera, are seen to occur and recur on many different but characteristic 
spatiotemporal scales––they can be seen as phenomena in their own respect that are relatively 
isolated from their environment. The challenge is to individuate systems at these characteristic 
scales (and the exceptions), construct models that capture the dynamics of the phenomena 
observed, and explore the way these phenomena transfer energy across their boundaries to other 
smaller or larger spatiotemporal scales.  
The individuation of phenomena can be challenging. This challenge is due to a lack of 
consensus about the identification of processes and their characteristic scales, or about whether 
any such processes or spatiotemporal scales exist. According to Emanuel, this issue is particularly 
evident in the case of the so-called mesoscale4: 
A serious question confronting the mesoscale meteorologist is whether there are 
really inherent scales in the atmosphere that one might reasonably use to define the 
mesoscale. . . . Do there exist ordered processes in the atmosphere that generate 
kinetic energy on scales within Ligda’s mesoscale domain (does a natural 
mesoscale exist), or does the “mesoscale” really consist only of a smooth, 
continuous, and uninteresting spectrum of disordered motions . . . ?” (Emanuel 
1986, 5) 
Ligda is a meteorologist who in the 1950s used the radar to investigate structures in the atmosphere 
and found stable structures recurring at scales smaller than the large scale5 but larger than the small 
                                                 
4  The mesoscale encompasses phenomena that are larger than a cumulus cloud but smaller than 
hurricanes. 
5 This is the scale where the dominant (fluid) motions are driven by the rotation of the earth and 
its circumference, as I will show below. 
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scale. He coined this range of scales the “mesoscale” and, since then, atmospheric scientists have 
attempted to find spatiotemporal scales at which kinetic energy is generated in this range and the 
phenomena associated therewith.6  
The scientific issues tied to identifying target systems mentioned in the cases described 
above will drive the philosophical arguments in this dissertation. Assumptions about the 
spatiotemporal scales at which phenomena occur play an important role in identifying target 
systems, and as such these assumptions can provide insight into the debate on the role of 
idealizations and abstractions in modeling. The use of these assumptions is important both in the 
process of collecting and analyzing data, and in the process of deriving appropriate mathematical 
models. The philosophical analysis of classical and novel philosophical problems such as 
idealization and structural uncertainty I provide shows that the approach taken in this dissertation 
is an approach that can provide a new perspective on these debates. While it is true that the 
identification of targets is part of the creative process of science, philosophers can identify those 
rational constraints that make the scientific process a reliable source of knowledge. Examples of 
the success of such work can be found in Bogen and Woodward (1988, 1992, 2005), Woodward 
(1989, 2000, 2011), and Peschard (2012a, 2012b). 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 takes up Bogen and 
Woodward’s distinction between data and phenomena. This distinction raises the need to 
understand the structure of the data-to-phenomena and theory-to-phenomena inferences. I suggest 
that one way to study the structure of these inferences is to analyze the role of the assumptions 
involved in the inferences: What kind of assumptions are they? How do these assumptions 
                                                 
6 The generation of kinetic energy is associated with a dynamic process that can be identified at 
that scale that generates this energy. 
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contribute to the practice of identifying phenomena? In this chapter, using examples from 
atmospheric dynamics, I develop an account of the practice of identifying the target in the data-to-
phenomena and theory-to-phenomena inferences in which assumptions about spatiotemporal 
scales play a central role in the identification of parameters that describe the target system. I also 
argue that these assumptions are not only empirical but they are also idealizing and abstracting. I 
conclude the chapter with a reflection on the role of idealizations in modeling. 
Chapter 3 analyzes in more depth the way that these scale related assumptions are 
employed in the data-to-phenomena and theory-to-phenomena inferences. The identification of 
phenomena for the case of data-to-phenomena inference is studied for the case of El Niño. While 
the details of the physics responsible for this phenomenon are still debated today, a major step in 
the scientific understanding of the phenomenon occurred in the nineties, when a new observation 
network was developed in the Pacific basin. The considerations that guided the development of 
this observation network were similar to the ones mentioned by Stommel described above: 
identifying physically meaningful variabilities in the parameters of interest involves making 
substantial assumptions about the spatiotemporal scales at which these variabilities are thought to 
occur. 
The identification of phenomena for the case of the theory-to-phenomena inference is 
studied by analyzing an important parametrization scheme in climate models. This parametrization 
scheme is an important tool for suppressing irrelevant details and making the models more 
computationally manageable, and, more importantly, helping scientists understand the behavior of 
target systems. Here, again, scale related assumptions play an important part in determining when 
this kind of parametrizations are justified and can indeed provide insight into the physical 
processes responsible for the phenomenon. The analysis of this parametrization scheme is a further 
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exemplification of the argument made in chapter 2: the scale related assumption employed in the 
justification of this parametrization is at the basis of the selection of parameters used to describe 
the phenomenon and is also an idealizing and abstracting assumption.  
Chapter 4 analyses the concept of “structural uncertainty” from the perspective of target 
system identification. Structural uncertainty is an epistemological problem climate scientists and 
philosophers have been concerned with especially in the context of climate science. This type of 
uncertainty is defined as uncertainty about whether a mathematical model accurately represents its 
intended target. A clear account of structural uncertainty is essential for the effective 
communication of the science to policy makers. I identify three desiderata that an account of 
structural uncertainty should meet in order to be useful to philosophers, scientists and policy 
makers. After reviewing some of the most influential accounts of structural uncertainty and 
addressing their shortcomings, I argue that a useful account of uncertainty in climate science can 
be given by looking at how target systems are identified in the context of climate modeling. In 
particular, I show how the use of assumptions about spatial and temporal scales that are involved 
in identifying and modeling target phenomena can lead to structural uncertainty.  
Chapter 5 analyses the ontological implications of the use of scale related assumptions. I 
suggest that the use of these assumptions provides a different perspective on the current literature 
on “levels.” I describe three of the prominent accounts of levels in the philosophical literature. 
These appear in the works of Levins, Wimsatt, and Mitchell. These accounts offer different 
philosophical perspectives on levels: Levins provides a descriptive epistemological approach, 
Wimsatt offers an ontological account of levels, and Mitchell uses the concept of level as a tool in 
her philosophical analysis of epistemic issues and metaphysical considerations of modeling a 
complex world. Their accounts overlap in many respects. In light of the discussion of identifying 
 15 
target systems in various branches of science given in the previous chapters, I suggest that the 
concept of level is best understood in terms of relevant variables and parameters that capture 
recurrent patterns occurring at particular spatiotemporal scales. 
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2.0 A ROLE FOR SPATIOTEMPORAL SCALES IN MODELING 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Among the many philosophically interesting topics related to modeling, one topic that has not 
received much attention is how scientists determine their target systems in the world. 7  As 
mentioned in chapter 1, two issues in the modeling literature bear on this topic. One concerns the 
role of idealization and abstraction in modeling, and the other concerns the relationship between 
theory, data and phenomena. This chapter shows how focusing on the role of scale related 
assumptions for the latter of these issues can inform the former. 
 In a series of papers, Bogen and Woodward have developed an influential account 
addressing the issue of the relationship between theory, data and phenomena (Bogen and 
Woodward 1988, 1992, 2005; Woodward 1989, 2000, 2011).  Their account involves three 
important points. First, theory does not explain data (Bogen and Woodward 1988, 305) and there 
are two conceptually distinct inferential processes in scientific practice, both aimed at 
characterizing features of the world of scientific interest: one in which explanations of phenomena 
are derived from theoretical principles, and one in which phenomena are inferred from data 
(Woodward 2011, 168). Second, inferences from data to phenomena are ampliative and usually 
                                                 
7 Two exceptions are Elliot-Graves (2014), which investigates the ontological status of target 
systems, and Peschard’s (2012a, 2012b) work discussed below. 
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involve empirical assumptions. The inferences are ampliative insofar as they “go beyond the data” 
(Woodward 2011, 173), and the assumptions are empirical in so far as they can be either true or 
false (Woodward 2011, 173).8 Third, pragmatic considerations of the scientist, such as her research 
interests and resources, can also play a role in these inferences (Woodward 2011, 174).  
 Bogen and Woodward’s account thus raises the need to understand the structure of the 
data-to-phenomena and theory-to-phenomena inferences (see also Woodward 2011, 170). One 
way to study the structure of these inferences is to analyze the role of the assumptions involved in 
the inferences: What kind of assumptions are they? How do these assumptions contribute to the 
practice of identifying phenomena? In this chapter I develop an account of the practice of 
identifying the target in the data-to-phenomena and theory-to-phenomena inferences. This account 
relies on recognizing the important role of assumptions about spatiotemporal scales in the 
identification of parameters that describe the target system. I also argue that these scale related 
assumptions are not only empirical, but they are also idealizing and abstracting. In this chapter I 
will supplement my argument with brief examples from atmospheric science. In the next chapter, 
I will provide more detailed examples from both climate science and oceanography.  
 The atmosphere is a particularly useful case study for illustrating the role of scale related 
assumptions in the process of identifying target systems. As mentioned in chapter 1, one of the 
main problems in meteorology is to discretize the continuous energy spectrum by individuating 
the phenomena that are associated with characteristic peaks in this spectrum. In order to model the 
dynamics of the phenomena observed, and explore the way these phenomena transfer energy 
across their boundaries to other smaller or larger spatiotemporal scales, scientists need to make 
                                                 
8 Woodward also suggests that these assumptions can be theoretical when they are about factors 
that cannot be observed (Woodward 2011, 173). 
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assumptions about the extent to which these phenomena can be separated from phenomena at other 
scales. 
 To delve deeper into the challenges involved with identifying phenomena, it is worth 
revisiting the important passages of Emanuel’s discussion quoted in chapter 1, repeated here for 
easy reference: 
A serious question . . . is whether there are really inherent scales in the atmosphere 
that one might reasonably use to define the mesoscale . . . Do there exist ordered 
processes in the atmosphere that generate kinetic energy on scales within Ligda’s 
mesoscale domain (does a natural mesoscale exist), or does the “mesoscale” really 
consist only of a smooth, continuous, and uninteresting spectrum of disordered 
motions . . . ? (Emanuel 1986, 5)  
 
The problem that the meteorologist has to face is whether one can resolve phenomena within the 
range of the mesoscale, i.e., whether there are stable patterns that can be characterized as 
phenomena. Emanuel’s quote illustrates that identifying phenomena is not a trivial endeavor, since 
scientists need to be able to distinguish what, if at all, is a genuine signal of an ordered motion 
from the noise of disordered motions. There are several challenges associated with identifying a 
genuine signal: first of all, the observations need to occur at a particular scale. Second, the data 
needs to be interpreted, for example by choosing the correct tools to eliminate noise. Third, the 
interpretation needs to be justified—the lack of a theoretical justification can lead scientists and 
philosophers to discard an interpretation as purely conventional or pragmatic. Major assumptions 
in these processes are scale related: phenomena are assumed to occur at particular spatiotemporal 
scales, and the scale separation assumption states that if the scales at which variables recur are 
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sufficiently different from one another, then they describe different phenomena. For example, the 
scale at which cumulus clouds occur is much smaller than the scales at which large scale 
phenomena, such as cyclones, occur. It is largely in virtue of this scale separation that they are 
considered different phenomena. The problem of identifying a target system is therefore tied to 
finding regularities occurring at various spatiotemporal scales and identifying what components 
describe the system’s dynamics. 
 I proceed as follows. In section 2.2 I use Bogen and Woodward’s distinction between data, 
phenomena and theory to describe the process of identifying target systems and I show that target 
system identification involves two important scale-related assumptions: the scale existence and the 
scale separation assumptions. I support my account with examples from the atmospheric sciences. 
I also explain how these assumptions are both idealizing and abstracting. Section 2.3 further 
clarifies my account by addressing three objections to my account. These are McAllister’s (1997) 
objection concerning the arbitrariness of certain assumptions in the data-to-phenomena inference, 
a possible circularity in the data-to-phenomena and theory-to-phenomena inferences, and the 
importance of what Peschard (2012a, 2012b) calls non-empirical “relevance judgments” (Peschard 
2012b, 749) in the identification of phenomena. Section 2.4 draws some conclusions about the 
nature of idealization in the context of the current philosophical debate given the discussion in 
sections 2.2 and 2.3.  
2.2 IDEALIZATIONS AND INFERENCES TO PHENOMENA 
In Bogen and Woodward’s framework, the main difference between data and phenomena is the 
following. Phenomena repeat themselves under many different conditions: they have “stable, 
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repeatable characteristics” (Bogen and Woodward 1988, 317), and can still be recognized as such 
despite these different conditions. Data, on the other hand, are tainted by the idiosyncrasies of the 
way the data are collected (Bogen and Woodward 1988, 317). In other words, data contain both 
the signal of the phenomenon of interest and the noise coming from possibly irrelevant factors of 
the world, while phenomena themselves abstract away from these irrelevant factors. Despite the 
fact that phenomena are abstracted from the irrelevant details generated by the measurement 
process, Bogen and Woodward claim that phenomena belong “to the natural order itself and not 
just to the way we talk about or conceptualize that world” (Bogen and Woodward 1988, 321).9  
 This characterization of data and phenomena lies at the core of Woodward’s claim that 
there are two different inferences to phenomena in scientific practice. First, theory explains 
phenomena and not individual pieces of data because the data contains both the signal of the 
phenomenon and various idiosyncrasies from measurement (Woodward 2011, 166). For example, 
scientists can explain the quantitative value of the melting point of lead by invoking characteristics 
of electron bonds and the presence of delocalized electrons present in lead. This is what Woodward 
calls a systematic explanation of a phenomenon from theory (Woodward 2011, 166). Second, a 
collection of data that measures the melting point of lead will be of statistical nature, the 
measurement being influenced by other factors the details of which are not typically known by the 
scientist (Woodward 2011, 167). The theory-to-phenomena and data-to-phenomena inferences can 
                                                 
9 A possible worry is that what counts as phenomena may be interest-relative. This would imply 
that there is no principled distinction between phenomena and data as Bogen and Woodward 
envisage. To address this worry, it may be useful to distinguish between what counts as 
phenomena and what counts as explananda. According to Bogen and Woodward’s view, 
phenomena are defined as regularities in the world. Of course, scientists may be interested in 
explaining the absence of regularities, such as the absence of a tide in a particular location. Thus, 
what counts as explananda may be interest relative, and not all explananda have to be 
phenomena in Bogen and Woodward’s sense. 
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be more or less independent of each other, especially when the theoretical apparatus is not well 
developed (Woodward 2011, 170).  
 Insofar as theory-to-phenomena and data-to-phenomena inferences are ampliative, they 
involve certain assumptions in addition to theoretical principles and data for reaching a conclusion. 
Thus, these assumptions are crucial for correctly identifying phenomena, and their role should be 
investigated further. Woodward suggests that these assumptions may vary greatly from case to 
case, but there are also generic assumptions, such as the assumption about the probability 
distribution governing the error in a data series (Woodward 2011, 172–173). In the next 
subsections, I show how two such general assumptions are scale related and play a central role in 
the process of identifying dynamic phenomena. 
2.2.1 Assumptions About Scales 
Two crucial assumptions involved in the identification of target systems are about the 
spatiotemporal scale at which the phenomenon occurs. These assumptions are: 
1. The scale existence assumption, which says that phenomena exist at 
characteristic spatiotemporal scales; and 
2. The scale separation assumption, which says that if two patterns are 
sufficiently separated in space and time, then they characterize two separable 
phenomena. 
These assumptions isolate the target system from its environment, and they are idealizing and 
abstracting in the most commonly accepted senses of the terms, such as those given by Jones 
(2005): an idealization is a distortion of the system, a useful falsehood about the system. An 
abstraction leaves out features of the system (or the world) that are irrelevant for a useful or 
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satisfactory description of the system (Jones 2005, 175). The scale existence and scale separation 
assumptions are idealizing in so far as they effectively remove variations in the data or terms in 
the equations that represent actual variabilities in the world. Smoothing of temperature fields (a 
consequence of the scale separation assumption), for example, introduces a distortion in the 
representation of the actual temperature fields found in the atmosphere (Emanuel 1986, 7). The 
same assumptions are also abstracting in so far as certain variations in the data are irrelevant for 
describing the target system at hand, and therefore can be removed. Smoothing the temperature 
fields at a particular scale allows for the isolation of variabilities in the fields at other, related, 
spatiotemporal scales.  
 In meteorology, identifying phenomena at their characteristic scales and modeling their 
dynamics using appropriate variables and parameters are central yet difficult enterprises (Emanuel 
1986). These tasks involve locating a system in space and time, as well as identifying the variables 
relevant for describing the conservation of energy within, and the energy transfer across, the 
system’s boundaries (Emanuel 1986, 6). This means that in order to characterize a target system, 
the scientist must both determine what parameters describe the system, and identify the scales at 
which these parameters recur. The correct choice of these parameters and their scales relies on the 
right application of the above assumptions. 
 Considerable challenges in modeling atmospheric phenomena are related to identifying the 
phenomenon and its components at their characteristic scales. These challenges are also related to 
the application of the above assumptions. Consider the case of cyclones: a cyclone can usually be 
distinguished as a phenomenon, yet it is not completely isolated from its environment (Emanuel 
1986, 6). Further, despite the fact that some characteristics of cyclones can be clearly observed 
and identified at their characteristic scales, there are no models that can describe their dynamics 
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accurately enough to make predictions (Montgomery and Smith 2014). The challenges for cyclone 
modeling derive from the multiscale nature of the phenomenon. The appropriate parameters to 
model the target system at the spatiotemporal scales at which it occurs (“the underlying physics”) 
have not been isolated from the “unsystematic details of the individual cases” (Davis and Emanuel 
1991, 1929).10 In other words, neither theoretical principles nor data analyses converge to a model 
that represents the most relevant variables that describe the cyclone’s dynamics.  
 The meteorologist Kerry Emanuel describes three strategies scientists have adopted to 
identify and describe target systems based on their characteristic scales: one empirical, one based 
on utility, and one theoretically motivated. The first and last of these strategies can inform the 
structure of the data-to-phenomena and theory-to-phenomena inferences. As I show in the next 
two subsections, these inferences importantly rely on the scale existence and scale separation 
assumptions.  
2.2.2 Idealization and Data to Phenomena Inferences  
In the data-to-phenomena inference, phenomena are identified from a collection of data. This 
inference involves distinguishing a signal, that is characteristic of the phenomenon, from noise, 
which may come from errors in measurement or other variations in the same parameter that are 
not characteristic of the phenomenon. The scale existence and separation assumptions enter this 
inferential process in the following way: the scale existence assumption is needed to focus on one 
recurrent pattern in the world. The scale separation assumption allows the scientist to isolate one 
                                                 
10 This point is made also in Bogen and Woodward’s discussion of “systematic explanations” 
(1988, 323). What Davis and Emanuel calls the “unsystematic details” are the data of quantities 
of interest of individual hurricanes the analysis of which does not lend itself to a unified 
interpretation. 
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pattern from another in order to differentiate between phenomena. By focusing on one pattern and 
distinguishing it from other patterns and other scales, modelers suppress irrelevant variabilities in 
a data series, abstracting these variabilities away. Further, these assumptions are invoked in data-
driven strategies for identifying phenomena in terms of their characteristic scales of motion11 both 
in the collection and interpretation of observations of physical quantities. 
 Phenomena can be identified through visual observations, weather maps, or spectral 
analysis. The main challenge for this identification of phenomena is to detect a pattern in the data 
at its characteristic scale despite noise from other scales. Weather maps, such as isobaric maps,12  
are one of the primary tools that exemplifies target system identification at scales that are not 
observable to the naked eye.13 These maps heavily rely on the scale existence and separation 
assumptions both when data is collected and when it is analyzed for creating the map.  
 For example, when creating a map, scientists assume that a pattern can be detected at a 
particular scale (be this for experimental or theoretical purposes) in order to set up a data collection 
network, and subsequently make use of statistical analysis in order to decompose the data series 
into its various components.14 If the components are separated enough in spatiotemporal scale, 
then one scale is—at least in the case of the instantaneous map—neglected in order to identify the 
target system of interest, introducing the idealization in the target system identification process. 
Spectral analysis of time series data relies similarly on these assumptions, and is aimed at providing 
                                                 
11 Emanuel (1988, 1) uses the term “definition of scale”, which should be understood as the 
identification of processes observed in the atmosphere in terms of their characteristic scales of 
motion. 
12 An isobar is a line of constant pressure on a map. 
13 Naked-eye observations are rather unproblematic. However, they only have a limited scope, as 
they are constrained by the visual field of an observer. For a discussion of the limitations of 
naked eye observations, see Houze (1993, Ch.1).  
14 The components do not need to be strictly periodic. 
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a rigorous quantification of the scales of phenomena identified by visual observations and/or maps. 
Spectral analysis usually aims at detecting the signal of the phenomena at their characteristic scale 
from the time series of observations. In this case, clearly separated peaks in the kinetic energy 
spectrum of a time series of data collected from the atmosphere or ocean surface indicate that there 
are stable recurrences of those energy values at a particular scale. These recurrences, in turn, 
correspond to a signal from phenomena recurring at characteristic scales.  
 Figure 2.1, reproduced below from chapter 1 for easy reference, shows some characteristic 
scales of motion associated with ocean surface processes, where the third, vertical axis is kinetic 
energy. In this case, kinetic energy is the parameter of interest. While the continuity of the 
spectrum indicates that there still is interaction across scales, the separated peaks in kinetic energy 
are associated with clearly distinguishable phenomena, like the tidal motion of the surface of the 
sea.  
 
Figure 2.1. Spatiotemporal scales of processes occurring on the ocean surface. From Stommel (1963). Reprinted 
with permission from AAS. 
 
 The identification of phenomena and the successful application of the scale existence and 
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separation assumptions depend on two main factors: the scale of the grid of observation stations 
and the data analysis. As a consequence, empirically driven identification of phenomena, and the 
correct application of the scale related assumptions, can fail in various ways. For example, a lack 
of rigorous systematization of the observation networks to study the dynamic processes in the 
ocean at different spatiotemporal scales may complicate statistical analysis. Further, a grid that 
resolves only one spatiotemporal scale is not going to capture all phenomena occurring in the 
ocean or the atmosphere (be this extremely coarse or fine-grained): different phenomena are 
observed using observational networks that resolve different spatiotemporal scales. For example, 
observing sea surface elevation only once a day (i.e., a temporal scale that captures variations from 
one day to another) does not capture the variation in sea surface elevation due to tidal motion. This 
is the case because peaks in kinetic energy due to tidal motions occur at and below the temporal 
scale of a day, as can be seen from figure 2.1. Such a time series, on the other hand, will capture 
variations due to geostrophic turbulence and meteorological effects, as these occur on scales 
slightly longer than the daily temporal scale. Note also that this time series will not be able to 
provide a clear characterization of larger scale variability, such as variations in sea surface 
elevation due to the melting and freezing of polar ice (“Ice Age Variations” in figure 2.1). 
Obtaining a trend for such a large-scale variability would involve averaging the data in a way that 
eliminates smaller scale variations, which is highly non-trivial.15 These examples illustrate that the 
relation between phenomena and the spatiotemporal scales at which they occur is a central topic 
                                                 
15 For example, scientists must make explicit assumptions about the distribution of smaller scale 
variability, and whether such small-scale variability is correlated with the scale of interest. This 
implies that knowledge of particular phenomena at one scale can inform how to extrapolate 
phenomena at other scales: the variability of some parameters at one scale can guide assumptions 
about how to average data at some contiguous scale. 
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for dynamic modeling of phenomena in the ocean and in the atmosphere.16  
 The scale related assumptions invoked in this case further illustrate the claim I made earlier 
that these assumptions are both abstracting and idealizing. As can be seen from figure 2.1, the 
parameter that is used to identify oceanic phenomena varies continuously from very small to very 
large spatiotemporal scales, and peaks occur at various, separated grip points. This feature has 
various implications. On the one hand, the scale existence and separation assumptions allow one 
to abstract the essential characteristics at which the phenomenon manifests itself—the scale at 
which the phenomenon recurs—from other, not directly relevant features: variations at other scales.  
The scale existence and separation assumption are also idealizing: they introduce a distortion in so 
far as they discretize a continuous spectrum.  
2.2.3 Idealization and Theory to Phenomena Inferences 
Like in the data-to-phenomena inference, the theory-to-phenomena inference also relies on the 
scale separation and scale existence assumptions. These assumptions are at the basis of scale 
analysis, an important component of the target system identification process. Scale analysis is 
further driven and substantiated by the interpretation of the physical processes that govern the 
phenomenon. 17  Hence, the existence of phenomena is inferred from dynamical and physical 
arguments and is based on the assumption that characteristic scales of motion exist, and that they 
can be separated from phenomena at other scales of motion. This inference proceeds in two main 
                                                 
16 The atmosphere and the ocean are considered analogous, and they are studied with the similar 
observation techniques and the same equations, up to the values of constant parameters such as 
viscosity. 
17 This is where the line between empirical assumptions and normative relevance judgments gets 
blurrier. Peschard (2012a, 56) also implicitly acknowledges that there might be some ambiguity. 
I will discuss the relation of Peschard’s work to mine in the next section. 
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stages.  
 First, possible scale related constraints on the dynamics of phenomena have to be identified. 
These are fairly independent of the details of the theory. For the case of atmospheric phenomena, 
these constraints are the sphericity and rotation of the earth, the depth of the atmosphere and its 
density. These are geometric boundaries that provide a first constraint on the possible scales of 
phenomena, and, as a consequence, on the application of the scale existence and separation 
assumptions. Second, physical arguments are used to justify the relevance of particular scales of 
motion for phenomena identified with these assumptions. In atmospheric dynamics, physical 
arguments are drawn from fluid dynamics: characteristic scales are described in terms of normal 
modes of oscillation and characteristic instabilities of the fluid.18 
 An example of a constraint on the target system identification in the first stage of the 
inference is the rotation of the earth, the most important geometrical constraint that qualitatively 
determines large scale phenomena in geophysical fluid dynamics. The so-called Rossby Number 
(RN) is a dimensionless parameter that allows one to quantitatively determine what terms in the 
equations of motion can be eliminated in order to describe the dynamics of large scale phenomena 
by means of dimensional analysis. 19  The RN, as other dimensionless parameters, is defined 
independently of the equations of motion. If L is the parameter for the characteristic scale of motion 
                                                 
18 The following analysis is taken from Pedlosky’s (1987) standard text. 
19 Dimensionless parameters are parameters that do not have a physical dimension (such as 
length, or velocity) attached to it. Dimensional analysis compares the relative size of 
dimensionless parameters when certain operations are performed, such as choosing a particular 
ordering relation. An ordering relation is a relation between dimensionless parameters. It allows 
one to study the behavior of one parameter when another parameter varies (this usually involves 
a limit), and to apply the scale separation assumption. I will provide an example of ordering 
relation later in the section. 
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of a phenomenon (the horizontal spatial variation of the dynamical fields of a phenomenon),20 and 
U is the characteristic velocity scale (the velocity of the phenomenon as a whole),21 then the RN 
is given by 
𝜀 =
𝑈
2Ω𝐿
 
where  is the period of rotation of the Earth. For rotation to play a role in the motion and structure 
of the system, 𝜀 must be of the order of one or less. The period of time it takes a fluid element to 
cross the whole system (the quantity L/U) has to be much smaller than the period of rotation of the 
earth for the rotation of the earth to have an effect on it. This consideration imposes some 
constraints on the possible spatiotemporal scales of large scale phenomena: values of  and , the 
geometrical boundary, restrict possible values of L/U. The RN therefore quantifies the geometrical 
constraint that the rotation of the earth imposes on the dynamics of phenomena. Since the RN is a 
function of the period of rotation of the earth, the stable patterns that arise at this scale are described 
in terms of a stability of the fluid that involves the Coriolis force, one of the inertial forces that 
drive the dynamics of motions that are affected by the earth’s rotation. Since stabilities are 
described in terms of a balance of forces, the Coriolis force is going to play a dominant role in the 
description of large scale phenomena that arise from these balances - and, as a consequence, is 
going to be irrelevant for the dynamics of phenomena the RN of which is greater than one. Further, 
when the large-scale balance is in place, small deviations from this balance are irrelevant. This 
provides further physical justifications for the elimination of irrelevant terms in the equations. 
 In the second stage, the scale-related constraint comes from physical arguments. For large-
                                                 
20 Systems in the atmosphere are usually characterized by waves in a field of varying pressure, 
density, temperature, etc. 
21 The values of L and U are usually established observationally. 
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scale horizontal motions, the balance is described in terms of the geostrophic approximation.22 The 
role of the geostrophic approximation is to eliminate the deviations from geostrophic motion, a 
motion in which the Coriolis force and the pressure gradient force are in balance. This balance is 
invoked to justify the elimination of the variations in the flow occurring at other scales, which are 
considered irrelevant for large scale phenomena. The equations of motion that are based on this 
balance yield solutions that describe the main motions of the large-scale atmosphere, such as 
Rossby waves.23  
 The above considerations are based on the scale existence assumption, as dimensional 
analysis is based on the assumption that “a single, well-defined scale for the velocity and its 
derivatives exists . . . [and] the magnitude of the terms in the equations of motion can be estimated 
in terms of these scales” (Pedlosky 1987, 340). This means that in order to find the simplified 
equations of motion that describe the behavior of a phenomenon at a particular scale, we need to 
start from the assumption that such a scale exists. From this assumption and the description of the 
relevant balances, scientists choose the ordering relation for the dimensionless parameters that are 
used in the equations of motion.  The ordering relation allow them to determine that some terms 
in the equations are of a small enough order to be neglected, granting the application of the scale 
separation assumption. 
 The assumptions just described are abstracting and idealizing. Applying the assumption 
that phenomena occur at characteristic spatiotemporal scale abstracts away from the small 
variations in scale that can occur due to negligible processes at other scales. Further, the physical 
interpretation of the balances that characterize the scales of cyclonic and anticyclonic systems also 
                                                 
22 Geostrophic balance is a balance in atmospheric wind flow between the pressure gradient force 
and the Coriolis force. 
23 For a full explanation and derivation of Rossby waves, see Pedlosky (1987, 374–385). 
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assumes that the vertical shear and stratification of the flow is constant. This introduces some 
idealizations in the description of the oscillations and instabilities that arise in the actual 
atmosphere (Emanuel 1986, 7). However, such simplifications are essential for the description of 
phenomena as these simplifications isolate them from scales of motion that are not directly relevant 
to the phenomenon.  
2.2.4 Assumptions About Scales: Reprise 
The above analysis highlights that the scale existence and separation assumptions play a crucial 
role in the observation, recognition and dynamic modeling of systems in the atmosphere. However, 
the application of the scale existence and scale separation assumption are only particularly 
effective when a scale can be clearly identified, either theoretically with the RN or empirically 
with data analysis. Consequently, one obstacle to identifying the scale of a phenomenon is the lack 
of clearly identifiable peaks in the parameters of interest.24 In this case, the assumption about the 
existence of a characteristic scale can be unreliable. 
 To overcome this obstacle, scientists take advantage of the fact that theory-to-phenomena 
and data-to-phenomena inferences can be mutually reinforcing. The theoretical derivations can in 
fact provide a justification for the numerical relations between parameters obtained by 
observations, and vice versa. Woodward claims that “the data-based reasoning to P and the fact 
that T predicts P mutually reinforce our confidence that P is real—the two sets of consideration 
are in a positive feedback relation with each other” (Woodward 2011, 178). In sections 3.2 and 
3.3, I show how the structure of the theory-to-phenomena and data-to-phenomena inferences 
                                                 
24 This obstacle may be due either to the fact that a phenomenon occurs on many scales, and 
therefore a peak is unobservable, or to the fact that indeed there are no phenomena—no recurring 
stabilities—of interest at that scale. 
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substantiates Woodward’s claim. 
2.3 OBJECTIONS 
So far, I have argued that the data-to-phenomena and theory-to-phenomena inferences involve 
empirical assumptions about the scale at which the phenomena occur and that these assumptions 
are a constraint imposed by the world on the identification of phenomena. Here I address three 
criticisms relevant to my account. One is McAllister’s worry about the arbitrariness of certain 
assumptions involved in the data-to-phenomena inferences. The second is the potential circularity 
of the data-to-phenomena and the theory-to-phenomena inferences. The third is Peschard’s idea 
that non-empirical assumptions rather than empirical ones play an important role in the 
identification of phenomena. I show that the analysis of the role of scale existence and scale 
separation assumptions in the process of identifying target systems can resolve these criticisms. 
2.3.1 Arbitrariness  
McAllister notes that there are infinitely many ways in which scientists can identify patterns in a 
data set (McAllister 1997, 220). However, only some of these patterns should count as phenomena 
in Bogen and Woodward’s sense. Thus, McAllister asks how Bogen and Woodward might be able 
to answer the question of which phenomena are part of the natural order of the world and which 
patterns are noise (McAllister 1997, 222). He suggests that for Bogen and Woodward to answer 
this question, they would have to acknowledge that some patterns get counted as phenomena by 
stipulation (McAllister 1997, 221–222). In other words, the question is not settled entirely by 
empirical considerations.  
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 McAllister is right in suggesting that there is some relativity to the interest of the scientist. 
For example, referring to figure 2.1, if a scientist is interested in “Geostrophic Turbulence,” then 
“Tidal Terms” will be noise in the dataset, and vice versa. Woodward replies to McAllister’s 
criticism by suggesting that assumptions involved in the scientist’s inferences are “empirical 
claims, that given a particular context, are either true or false” (Woodward 2011, 179). How the 
context of research is set up depends on the interest of the scientist, but in a given context, the 
assumptions used in the inferences to phenomena are subject to specific empirical tests. The 
account of the data-to-phenomena inferences developed in section 2.2 reinforces this response. 
Once the choice has been made about the scale at which data has to be collected, the application 
of the scale existence and scale separation assumption can either succeed or fail, depending on 
whether the scientists is collecting and analyzing the data at scales at which recurrent patterns 
occur in the world. As can be seen in figure 2.1, peaks in the energy spectrum correspond to 
recurrences of phenomena at particular spatiotemporal scales. This means that when data is 
collected and interpreted, there are scales at which phenomena in Bogen and Woodward’s sense 
can be identified as well as scales at which there are no phenomena to be resolved.25 In other words, 
if scientists choose the ‘wrong’ scale at which to collect and analyze data, they are not going to be 
able to resolve the peaks in the spectrum that are associated with phenomena.26 
 It is true that when there are no clear peaks in the spectrum, as is the case with the mesoscale, 
scientists do face difficulties in identifying relevant scales of motion. Nevertheless, the fact that 
                                                 
25 As noted in footnote 9, this of course does not mean that there will be nothing of explanatory 
interest. 
26 Levin also makes this point: “This is the principal technique of scientific inquiry: by changing 
the scale of description, we move from unpredictable, unrepeatable individual cases to 
collections of cases whose behavior is regular enough to allow generalizations to be made” 
(Levin 1992, 1947). 
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pragmatic choices do sometimes feature in data analysis does not imply that all phenomena are 
individuated exclusively by pragmatic choices. One seemingly pragmatic aspect of empirical 
identification of patterns in the data is the method of collection and interpretation of data. New 
observation techniques and tools for statistical analysis allow scientists to detect patterns at scales 
that were previously unobserved, as was the case for mesoscale phenomena: while before the 
1950s atmospheric scientists were focusing only on the large scale, the introduction of radar as a 
tool for observation allowed scientists to collect new kinds of data that allowed for the resolution 
of patterns at scales that were previously unobservable. Similarly, the use of more sophisticated 
statistical tools allowed the meteorologist Sir Gilbert Walker to identify the “Southern Oscillation,” 
a large scale climatic phenomenon (see Katz 2002, Pincock 2009). However, one should 
differentiate between the tools one uses to investigate the world and the world itself. While tools 
can change with advances in technology, the fact that scientists can identify patterns at particular 
scales (i.e., at some scales and not others) suggests that these patterns are not an artifact of the 
method of observation. If the patterns were indeed just an artifact of the method of identification, 
then scientists should be able to identify patterns at arbitrarily chosen scales. However, this is not 
the case: scientists can identify patterns only at specific scales, and this suggests that the world, 
rather than the scientists and the tools they use, imposes constraints on the types of patterns that 
can be identified.27  
                                                 
27 Woodward also suggests that “true empirical assumptions will not license inconsistent 
phenomena claims from the same data” (Woodward 2011, 175). For example, in atmospheric 
dynamics, if data are collected and analyzed at a particular spatiotemporal scale (with a 
particular level of accuracy), then the confidence in the use of particular scale related 
assumptions will be reinforced if different research groups should identify the same regularities 
or irregularities in the data set at a given scale. 
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2.3.2 Circularity 
The second potential problem for my account is that the convergence of the data-to-phenomena 
and theory-to-phenomena inferences for gaining confidence in the successful isolation of a 
phenomenon may be misleading because of a circularity: if theoretical elements are involved in 
the data-to-phenomena inference, and/or vice-versa, then the fact that the data-to-phenomena and 
the theory to phenomena inferences converge is no sign of confidence in the fact that scientists 
have identified a genuine phenomenon.28 
 In my view, the circularity is not vicious. This is because the scale assumptions involved 
in the data- and theory-to-phenomena inferences are motivated differently. In section 2.2.3, I have 
briefly described how dimensional analysis is used to obtain a simplified set of equations that 
describes large scale atmospheric motions. The empirical input into this derivation enters at the 
stage of evaluating the quantitative value for the length scale L and the velocity scale U of the 
phenomenon (the “order of magnitude”).  The order of these parameters then allows for an estimate 
of the order of magnitude of the RN. To obtain the equations of motion for the large-scale system, 
several further steps need to be taken. Once the variables in the equation are written in terms of 
the non-dimensional parameters, one needs to choose particular ordering relations between the 
parameters before expanding the terms in the equation and discarding the terms that are not of the 
order of interest. An example of such an ordering relation is letting  tend to zero while letting 
r0/L remain of the order of one. r0 is the radius of the earth, and all other terms are defined as in 
section 2.2.3. This limiting ordering relation identifies large scale phenomena the vorticity of 
                                                 
28 I understand that when theoretical elements occur in the data-to-phenomena inference and 
empirical elements in the theory-to-phenomena inference, it may become difficult to categorize 
them as two distinct types of inference. I will not address this worry in this dissertation. 
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which is driven both by planetary (driven by the rotation of the earth) and relative (driven by the 
local features of the phenomenon, in particular its size L) vorticity. 
 While the choice of ordering relation is determined by the observational evidence that 
determines the values for L and U, this does not suffice. As Pedlosky explains:  
We must, in addition, bring to the scaling analysis an intuitive appreciation that 
certain ordering relationships are highlighted by the way they distinguish important 
and natural physical balances that are physically relevant to the phenomena of 
interest. (Pedlosky 1987, 346)  
These are balances such as the geostrophic balance, described in section 2.2.3. The ordering 
relation is ultimately at the heart of the theory to phenomena inference: it is based on the scale 
existence assumption, i.e., that phenomena occur at particular scales (see Pedlosky (1987, 340)), 
and it is the relation that allows to eliminate irrelevant terms from the equations of motion. The 
assumption about the scale of motion is thus part of a complex theoretical apparatus.  
 Here the circularity is not vicious. In the case of the empirical input in the theory-to-
phenomena inference, the quantitative value of L and U is considered meaningful only if the 
ordering relation that is associated with them reflects a physically meaningful balance. As 
Pedlosky states in the above passage, different ordering relations highlight different processes in 
the atmosphere. On the other hand, the theoretical interpretation of the physically meaningful 
balances is fairly independent of the observed values of L and U, as the interpretation is guided by 
the geometrical boundaries described above. In the example I have given, the Coriolis force plays 
a dominant role in the balancing of forces, and the geostrophic balance is a balance that reflects 
this contribution in the dynamics of phenomena at the large scale.  
 In the case of the theoretical input in the data-to-phenomena inference, the physical 
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interpretation of the ordering relation (i.e., the geostrophic balance) provides a theoretical 
justification for the data-to-phenomena inference: “[The] recognition of the particular meaning of 
this ordering relation then gives confidence that the observed numerical relations between 
parameters are not merely fortuitous” (Pedlosky 1987, 346). The numerical relations are obtained 
by plugging in values obtained by observations in the terms of the dimensionless parameters. This 
illustrates that the data-to-phenomena inference and the theory-to-phenomena inference are in a 
non-viciously circular feedback relation. The empirical data-to-phenomena inference, in this case, 
involves choosing the scale at which to average the spectrum for a particular parameter (e.g., the 
wind velocity) in order to obtain a characteristic scale. That value for the characteristic scale allows 
the theoretician to determine the order of the dimensionless parameters used to obtain the equations 
of motion for large scale phenomena. Together with some related physical interpretation of the 
system (e.g., geostrophic balance), the theoretician can obtain a particular (limiting) ordering 
relation between the parameters that allows her to obtain the new set of equations of motion. The 
physical interpretation of the ordering relation then gives confidence in the numerical values 
observed for the parameters at the scale of motion considered.  
2.3.3 Empirical and Normative Assumptions 
Peschard (2012a, 2012b) argues that important assumptions that identify the target system as such 
are not empirical, but normative. She calls these normative judgments “relevance judgments,” and 
define them as follows: 
Relevance judgments . . . are judgments of what quantity should be measured, 
or, correlatively, what effect should be taken into account by a measurement 
procedure. (Peschard 2012a, 750) 
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Relevance judgments are judgments about what relevant parameters and what effects of the 
parameters need to be taken into account to represent a target system. Peschard claims that 
relevance judgments are not empirical:  
But suppose now that the claim under test cannot be interpreted as being 
about a data-generating procedure. The issue then arises of what data-
generating procedure is adequate for the test and generates data that qualify 
as benchmark for the evaluation of the claim. . . . The reliability of a given 
experimental procedure will depend on the answer to the question. This 
answer is a judgment that specifies what sort of data need to be acquired and 
will need to be accounted for by a model about the crime rate or the receptive 
field [the phenomenon]. It is not an empirical judgment; it is what we have 
called a ‘relevance judgment. (Peschard 2012b, 758) 
She distinguishes these types of judgments from claims about the reliability of data-gathering 
procedures, which, she argues, are empirical claims that can be tested only when phenomena are 
already established. Empirical assumptions are therefore assumptions that occur later in the 
modeling process, when the target system has already been identified. 
 If Peschard is right, then the scale existence and separation assumptions are not important 
for the process of identifying phenomena. However, my thesis has been that empirical assumptions 
are important for this process. The apparent conflict between these two views can be resolved if 
we compare the role of relevance judgments. As Peschard says, relevance judgments play at least 
two roles: selecting parameters that describe phenomena as well as the effects of the parameters, 
which also describe phenomena. The scale existence and separation assumptions play the same 
roles. Non-empirical, relevance judgments are therefore not the only types of judgments involved 
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in the process of identifying phenomena. 
2.4 THE PURPOSE OF IDEALIZATION 
The scale existence and scale separation assumptions play an idealizing and abstracting role in the 
data-to-phenomena and in the theory-to-phenomena inferences. In this section I will argue that 
these idealizing assumptions are essential for the target system identification process.  
 Weisberg (2013) argues that there are many kinds of idealization, and different aims of the 
scientists may require different kinds of idealization. The three kinds of idealizations that Weisberg 
identifies include the ones mentioned above: Galilean Idealization, Minimalist Idealization and 
Multiple Model Idealization. He suggests that Galilean Idealizations (McMullin 1985) are 
pragmatically motivated idealizations, which are dependent on the status of the theoretical 
apparatus available to the scientist. Further, these idealizations are a distortion of the target system 
that may be removed as the science advances (Weisberg 2013, 99–100). Minimalist Idealizations, 
on the other hand, are idealizations that are part of models that include essential causal factors of 
the target system, and are in this sense ineliminable. Weisberg associates this view with Strevens 
(2004) and Batterman (2001, 2002, 2009). The two accounts of idealizations however are rather 
different, as for Strevens idealizations are non-difference making features of the model (Strevens 
2004, 174), while for Batterman idealizations are procedures involved in obtaining a minimal 
model of a universality class that contains features that are common to several systems (Batterman 
2002, 35). The common denominator of these two accounts is that the idealization is part of the 
explanatory text of the phenomena that the model represents. The third kind of idealization 
Weisberg introduces is the Multiple Model Idealization. In this case, idealizations are introduced 
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to build inconsistent models of the same phenomenon. However, Weisberg argues, the 
inconsistency between models is warranted as the models aim to explain different aspects of the 
phenomenon of interest (Weisberg 2013, 103–105). While this taxonomy might be useful for 
descriptive purposes, it does not shed light on how the idealization process isolates the target 
system from its environment. 
 Idealizations are in fact usually discussed in the context of already established target 
systems: once the target system is established, an idealization is introduced to eliminate intractable 
aspects of the target system or to highlight particular aspects thereof. However, in the previous 
sections I have shown that idealizations feature importantly in the target system identification 
process: they are responsible for identifying relevant parameters that describe the target system. 
Thus, these idealizing assumptions are necessary for obtaining knowledge about the world.  
2.5 CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this chapter, I have asked what kind of assumptions are involved in the data-
to-phenomena and theory-to-phenomena inferences, and how these assumptions contribute to the 
practice of identifying phenomena. In describing the idealizing role of scale existence and scale 
separation assumptions, I have argued that they are necessary empirical assumptions in the target 
identification process: these assumptions are one of the building blocks of the data-to-phenomena 
and theory-to-phenomena inferences. They distinguish signal from noise in the first case, and guide 
scale analysis, and consequently the (formal) choice of relevant parameters in the second case. 
This suggests, in line with general features of Batterman’s view, that idealizations are part of a 
process that isolates stable patterns in the world. Idealizations and abstractions are ineliminable in 
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so far as they are the isolate the relevant aspects of the (parameters that describe the) target 
system.29 In particular, spatiotemporal idealizations are fundamental to the modeling process in 
because they isolate the target system from its environment.30 Under this reading of the science, 
models can represent and explain the world in virtue of idealizations, not in spite of them. 
 This account of the role of idealization in the data-to-phenomena and theory-to-phenomena 
inference illustrates that discussing the relation between data, theory and phenomena can provide 
insight into the role of idealizations in modeling. More precisely, the analysis of the structure of 
the inferential relation from data and from theory to phenomena illustrates how idealizations 
feature in the process of identifying target systems, and, as a consequence, how models of target 
systems can provide reliable knowledge of the world. 
  
                                                 
29 The difference between my account and Batterman’s is that mine is slightly more general and 
is not tied to a philosophical account of explanation. 
30 In the context of Peschard’s work, they provide the empirical basis for the isolation of the 
target system from its environment. 
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3.0 DATA AND THEORY TO PHENOMENA INFERENCES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that assumptions about the scale of phenomena are empirical 
assumptions that play an important role in the identification of targets. These assumptions are 
idealizing and abstracting and can occur both in theory-to-phenomena and data-to-phenomena 
inferences. This chapter further illustrates these claims. The last chapter analyzed the assumptions 
for a very well-established case. The identification of large scale phenomena such as Rossby waves 
and the derivation of the modeling equations for these phenomena are included in most fluid 
dynamics textbooks. In this chapter, I will take an historical approach and discuss the development 
of the characterization of climate phenomena over time. As in chapter 2, I will analyze the scale 
existence assumption and the scale separation assumption. The latter relies on the former; one 
needs to first assume that a phenomenon exists at a characteristic scale before establishing a 
criterion for differentiating one phenomenon from the other.  
The data-to-phenomena inference is studied for the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) 
phenomenon, where the spatial arrangement of the observation network and temporal sampling of 
data play a fundamental role in understanding ENSO phenomenon and identifying its main 
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components. I will illustrate two landmark steps that improved the scientists’ understanding of 
ENSO.  
In the fifties, a prominent meteorologist Bjerknes suggested a general mechanism for 
ENSO. While this was a crucial step towards identifying ENSO as the phenomenon that we know 
today, it was not until an array of buoys that was specifically aimed at resolving particular scales 
that a more satisfactory characterization of ENSO arose. Here is the second step: a failure to detect 
the onset of a particularly strong ENSO event in the early eighties prompted the development of a 
research program that aimed at creating an observation network that would resolve the scales at 
which the main components of ENSO were thought to take place. Important methodological steps 
of this program involved paying attention to the role of spatiotemporal scales in data collection 
and data analysis for the identification of phenomena.  
The need for an array of observation stations that takes particular scales into account 
suggests that the data to phenomena inference involves nontrivial assumptions about the scales at 
which phenomena and its components are identified. While Bjerknes had already identified ENSO 
as a phenomenon occurring on the spatial scale of the Pacific Ocean and peaking during January, 
he could not provide the scientific community with the conceptual tools to identify the occurrence 
of all subsequent ENSO events (most notably the ENSO of 1982–83). For a clear signal from 
ENSO to be detected, an organized data collection array was needed that would provide data sets 
at spatial and temporal scales fine grained enough to distinguish the signal of the phenomenon and 
its components from the noise coming from other scales. This process illustrates that scale related 
assumptions are pervasive in the process of identifying a phenomenon and its’ component.  
The theory-to-phenomena inference is studied for the case of the parametrization scheme 
introduced by Arakawa and Schubert in 1974. This parametrization scheme is used to parametrize 
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cloud physics that occurs at scales smaller than cumulus clouds of a larger system. An example of 
a larger system is a hurricane. A core assumption in the justification of the Arakawa-Schubert 
parametrization scheme is the scale separation assumption: the parametrization is considered valid 
because the cloud physics occurs at scales much smaller than the scale of interaction of collections 
of cumulus clouds within a hurricane, or another large scale perturbation. This assumption is 
essential not only for obtaining models that predict the behavior of phenomena in which the 
parametrization is employed, but it is also used as a crucial tool for understanding the dynamics of 
such phenomena. This parametrization scheme is an example of how the scale separation 
assumption is used to justify what physics gets included into a model of a phenomenon (interaction 
between ensembles of cumulus clouds and the other components of the phenomenon) and which 
is not (physics of single cumulus clouds). 
3.2 ENSO: THE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE DATA TO PHENOMENA INFERENCE 
The definition of ENSO that is most widely accepted by today’s scientific community is the 
following: 
El Niño can be said to occur if 5-month running means of sea surface temperature 
(SST) anomalies in the Nino 3.4 region (5N-5S, 120-170W) exceed 0.4C for 6 
months or more. (Trenberth 1997, 2771) 
This definition is based on the assumption that a time averaged mean in a particular region is 
characteristic of the phenomenon, which spans over the whole Pacific over a period of more than 
5 months, if one considers its onset, its peak and its dissolution. The question that this section will 
explore is what role the scale existence assumption plays in the driving the data collection and 
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analysis that lead to this definition. In other words, what role does the scale existence assumption 
play in data to phenomena inference that identifies a phenomenon defined by the above quote?  
I will start answering this question by illustrating theoretical framework that lead to a drastic 
change in the way in which oceanic data was collected in order to identify the main components 
of ENSO. This is the framework provided by the important contributions of Bjerknes (1969). I 
will show how his own contribution also rests on the scale existence assumption. I will then 
describe the new data collection experiment that followed the realization that that framework was 
not satisfactory–it did not allow scientists to recognize the onset of a particularly significant ENSO 
event in the early eighties. Again, scale related assumptions played a major role in this process. 
3.2.1 Bjerknes 
Bjerknes is recognized as the first meteorologist to define ENSO as a basin wide phenomenon that 
involves the interaction between atmospheric and oceanic components. Bjerknes identified a 
recurring anomaly from average pressure and sea surface temperature values of the Pacific Ocean 
in particular seasons across different years, and this anomaly occurred simultaneously for 
atmospheric and oceanic parameters. He associated these anomalies with a disruption of a 
circulation of air above the Pacific called the “Walker Circulation.”31 The anomalies are associated 
with above average rainfall and a characteristic low-pressure pattern across the pacific basin for 
the month of January (basin-wide spatial scale, one month long temporal scale). 
The scale related assumption at the basis of his description of ENSO is the scale existence 
assumption, namely that there is a characteristic scale at which the phenomenon can be identified. 
                                                 
31 For a historical and philosophical discussion of the discovery of the Walker Circulation, see 
Katz (2002), Pincock (2009). 
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The scale existence assumption is justified by the fact that the anomalies observed in the mean 
field at the scale that defines the phenomenon are recurrent: there are semi regular intervals at 
which the variability that defines ENSO occurs. In particular, ENSO anomalies as defined by 
Bjerknes recur in the month of January (though not necessarily at regular intervals).  
The assumption about the existence of a scale at which the phenomenon occurs appears in 
Bjerknes’ analysis of the air pressure, rainfall and sea temperature data of the years 1956–1967 for 
stations in the Pacific basin area:  
The selection of the January maps of 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, and 1967 brings into 
focus the anomalies of the large-scale flow that evolved together with the extreme 
coolness and dryness of the central Pacific equatorial belt in January 1963, 1965, 
and 1967 and the extreme warmth and rain surplus of the same belt in January 1964 
and 1966. (Bjerknes 1969, 164; my emphasis) 
Bjerknes states that he is explicitly choosing maps that represent the large scale flow at specific 
spatial and temporal intervals. This choice of maps allows him to show that the winters of 1963–
64 and the winter of 1965–66 are associated with an anomaly in the flow pattern spanning the 
whole pacific basin that occurs at the same time as what was previously thought to be ENSO 
events.32 The anomaly that emerges from the analysis of the data for these years, he concludes, is 
a disturbance large enough to provide a persistent disruption of the large scale pressure fields and 
eliminating the typical wind patterns (Bjerknes 1969, 165). 
 
 
                                                 
32 ENSO events were previously associated with a change in rain patterns along the Western 
coast of the Americas. 
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Figure 3.1. Time series of monthly air and sea temperature and of monthly precipitation at Canton Island from 1950 
to 1967. From Bjerknes (1969). 
The figures provided illustrate the anomaly identified by Bjerknes. Figure 3.1 shows the monthly 
average values for temperature and rainfall in Canton (Canton Island is an Island of the Kiribati 
Archipelago, in the mid-west equatorial Pacific). There are clear peaks in the average values for 
December 1957 to January 1958, and in the average values for the December–January period in 
the years 1963-64 and 1965-66. The important feature of these data series is that they reveal peaks 
in rainfall and temperature that occur more or less simultaneously, always in the same season. 
Further, these peaks occur in the same season as El Nino events registered on the Western Coast 
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of South America, i.e. a heavy rainfall along the northern coast of western South America and a 
warming of the sea surface temperature (SST) along that coast. The resulting correlation between 
different locations in rainfall and temperature increase indicates that the anomaly is associated 
with a phenomenon that occurs at the scale of the Pacific Ocean. To corroborate this claim–i.e. 
that the peaks in rainfall are part of one phenomenon and not just two phenomena occurring 
simultaneously in different regions of the globe–maps of the whole Pacific basin are produced. 
 
Figure 3.2. January 1963 distribution of pressure (millibars) at sea level. From Bjerknes (1969). 
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Figure 3.3. January 1964 distribution of pressure (millibars) at sea level. Change from January 1963 in dashed
isallobars. From Bjerknes (1969). 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show average pressure patterns for January for the years 1963– for which there 
is no ENSO, dry and cool Eastern Pacific conditions–and 1964–for which there is an ENSO event, 
hot and wet Eastern Pacific conditions–at the scale of interest. The comparison between the maps 
that resolve this particular scale reveal a clear shift in the pressure pattern along the equator in the 
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Pacific basin: the 1010mb isallobar,33 that during January 1963 only extends eastward a third of 
the way along the equator, extends all the way to the coast of Colombia and Peru during the January 
of 1964, bringing heat and humidity to an otherwise cool and dry region. A similar change in 
pattern can be observed for the same region in the Januaries of 1965 and 1966 (Bjerknes 1969, 
164). 
The scale existence assumption is evident in Bjerknes’ use of the data series and the maps 
to identify ENSO as a basin-wide phenomenon rather than a phenomenon that only occurs on the 
Western coast of the Americas:  The maps of the observed parameters at a particular scale, and in 
particular monthly averages, show that there is a recurring anomaly of the pressure and temperature 
fields, and average rainfall amount resolved by this particular choice of average. The recurrence 
of this anomaly prompts Bjerknes to claim that there is a stable phenomenon occurring quasi 
periodically over the same region at a particular time scale. Fluctuations in physical quantities of 
interest can occur on larger and smaller scales, but at the monthly spatiotemporal scale these 
variations can be given physical meaning. 
The identification of the scale at which ENSO occurs, however, does not suffice to fully 
characterize the phenomenon. Bjerknes himself states that to identify other components of the 
phenomenon, data should also be analyzed and collected at smaller scales–which implies that 
components of the phenomenon can and do occur at other scales: 
The time lag of the large-scale atmospheric response to the initial anomaly of heat 
input from the equatorial ocean appears to be quite small and would have to be 
identified by daily instead of monthly basic data. (Bjerknes 1969, 165) 
                                                 
33 An isallobar is a line on a map connecting points at which the atmospheric pressure has 
changed by an equal amount during a specified interval of time. 
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Bjerknes is stating that the anomaly in the oceanic conditions starts slightly earlier than the 
anomaly in atmospheric conditions, suggesting that there must be some processes that occur at 
smaller scales that connect the two anomalies. Bjerknes suggests that the investigation of how 
anomalies in the pressure and sea surface temperature fields are related should be conducted at a 
scale smaller than the one he has been investigating.34 
There is a difference in the scale of resolution depending on what is being sought about the 
target system. To identify the extent of ENSO, it was sufficient to identify a correlation between 
the large scale anomalies in the relevant physical quantities: a recurrent pattern was observed at 
the scale of the pacific basin both in pressure and sea surface temperature values. However, to 
fully appreciate the extent of the phenomenon and the scale at which it occurs, a different temporal 
scale needs to be investigated. In the next section I will illustrate how a different strategy for data 
collection needed to be developed in order to be able to detect ENSO before it reaches its peak.  
The importance of the scale existence assumption in this process is that the scale of the 
phenomenon as a whole is the starting point for identifying the phenomenon and starting to build 
a model thereof. The data gets collected and analyzed at the scale at which the phenomenon is 
assumed to occur, and a similar procedure is implemented when components of a phenomenon are 
identified––if they occur at scales different from the scale of the phenomenon as a whole, which 
occurs often in climate modeling. I will now describe how paying attention to the scale of the 
phenomenon and its component lead to the development of an observation network that lead to a 
more effective characterization of ENSO. 
                                                 
34 The details of the mechanism that connects the oceanic and atmospheric components of ENSO 
are still disputed today (Guilyardi et al. 2009). 
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3.2.2 TAO and TOGA 
The need for a principled observation network that would resolve different scales of motion arose 
not long after the recognition that ENSO is a coupled ocean-atmosphere phenomenon–a 
phenomenon that has both atmospheric and oceanic components. In the years 1982–1983, the 
scientific community realized that the models that were used to predict ENSO failed to capture 
some of the salient components of the phenomenon. That year’s ENSO “was neither predicted nor 
detected until nearly at its peak” (McPhaden 2006, 85). The lack of being able to predict the 
phenomenon indicated to the scientific community interested in studying ENSO that more data 
needed to be collected, and given the complexity of the phenomenon, data collection should be 
planned carefully and systematically. In McPhaden’s own words recollecting the status of ENSO 
research at the time––he served as of the lead oceanographers of the Tropical Ocean Global 
Atmosphere (TOGA)  experiment: 
The sparsity of accurate oceanic measurements in 1982 exposed not only our 
ignorance about El Niño’s complexity but also the gross inadequacy of existing 
observing systems to measure and describe it. (McPhaden 2006, 86; my emphasis) 
There were only few stationary buoys that could collect time series data of sea surface temperature 
and most data was collected by commercial ships and the newly developed satellites (McPhaden 
2006, 85). In order to detect an ENSO event, warmer than average sea surface temperature should 
be observed for a period of time. This, however, did not occur. Satellite data for 1982 year showed 
a cold temperature bias caused by the eruption of a volcano in southern Mexico, which was 
mistaken for cloud cover. The warmer temperature values of the data collected in situ was 
discarded as being outliers (McPhaden 2006, 85), which lead scientists to conclude that that year 
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normal conditions would prevail, and no ENSO event would occur. However, after a couple of 
months, they were proven wrong when they observed the peak of an ENSO event. 
The satellite data had proven unreliable–the source of the bias was not correctly attributed 
to its cause until later. Scientists had been relying too heavily on the satellite data: the data coming 
from the few stationary buoys that were actually indicating the warmer conditions, which should 
have warned the scientists of the onset of an ENSO event, was discarded as an outlier. The 
inadequacy of the data collection and analysis that year indicated that in order to better understand 
ENSO, more stationary, long term, observation stations were needed across the Pacific basin. The 
goal was to build an observation network that could clearly distinguish the signal coming from 
ENSO from signals coming from other phenomena at different scales.  
The observation system implemented for the purpose to better identify ENSO and its 
components throughout the 80s and 90s was the TOGA program. Its wider scope was to support 
climate studies from the seasonal to the interannual timescale across the Pacific basin (McPhaden 
et al. 1998, 169). The program brought two main scale-related innovations with respect to past 
data collection. First, it would be a long term program (of at least 10 years). This time scale was 
thought to be the scale at which physically significant interannual oscillations recur at the spatial 
scale of the Pacific basin. Second, it would have a fixed network of observation stations (instead 
of drifters—moving data-collecting buoys—or data collected by ships). A fixed network would 
provide a time-dependent picture of the basin scale variations of parameters of interest: 
This observing system was to provide data on a basin scale for at least 10 years 
without significant temporal gaps, so that a continuous record of climate variability 
could be assembled. Ten years was considered the minimum length of time needed 
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for a comprehensive study of interannual variability, the dominant mode of which 
was the ENSO cycle. (McPhaden et al. 1998, 171) 
Here, McPhaden is highlighting the importance of an organized array of observations aimed at 
detecting physically meaningful scales of motion, i.e. fluctuations of the wind, pressure and 
temperature fields associated with phenomena of interest such as ENSO.  
This reasoning is in line with Stommel’s (1963) observation described in chapter 1, 
according to which different phenomena occur at different scales, and a systematic observation 
network can provide data that can be analyzed more easily. Further, a systematic array that can 
collect data at many time scales at a fixed spatial scale can help reduce difficulties tied to scale 
detection: in order to resolve peaks in the data that are associated with phenomena of interest, the 
noise needs to be resolved in order to avoid contamination and, as a consequence, misguided 
claims about the phenomenon of interest. 
It was recognized at the start of TOGA that although ENSO is predominantly a 
large-scale, interannual perturbation of the climate system, it could not be 
effectively observed without taking into account smaller-scale, higher frequency 
fluctuations. There is a broad spectrum of variability in both the ocean and the 
atmosphere that represents a broad spectrum of geophysical noise in estimates of 
climate signals. Noise contamination can arise because of inadequate sampling in 
space and/or time which will alias energy from high-frequency, small-scale 
fluctuations into the lower frequencies and larger scales of climatic interest. 
(McPhaden et al. 1998, 174; my emphasis) 
Signals from phenomena occurring at other scales can muddy the signal from the ENSO 
phenomenon, and in order to detect the ENSO signal, this noise needs to be correctly identified.  
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If the signal of a phenomenon can be identified at a particular scale (the scale existence 
assumption), the associated dynamical field can be characterized in the following way: 
Ψ(𝒙)𝑜𝑏𝑠 =  Ψ(𝒙) + 𝜀Ψ(𝒙) 
where the left-hand side of the equation represents the observed field (i.e. the time series of a 
parameter x = (x, y, z, t) in space and time) and the right hand side represents the separation in 
scale of the field of the phenomenon itself  Ψ(𝒙) and the noise on the field coming from 
measurement error and variability at unresolved scales 𝜀Ψ(𝒙). Unless 𝜀Ψ(𝒙) is randomly distributed, 
the operation of separating signal and noise is nontrivial. If multiple scales can be resolved, and 
there are two components at two different scales, then the observed field can be characterized in 
the following way:35 
Ψ(𝒙)𝑜𝑏𝑠 =  Ψ(𝒙) +  Ψ′(𝒙) + 𝜀Ψ(𝒙) 
Where Ψ′(𝒙) is the smaller scale signal, and the rest is defined as above. The smaller scale signal 
is the anomaly on the larger scale field, and, like measurement error and unresolved scales, can 
introduce error in the identification of the large scale signal.  
An instance of the of identifying a signal of a phenomenon from a data series is the data 
on which Bjerknes relies to identify ENSO. As described above, this data can sometimes be 
misleading: 
Various versions of the SOI [Southern Oscillation Index] exist although, in recent 
years, most deal only with atmospheric pressures and usually only those of Darwin 
and Tahiti. In using the SOI based on just two stations, it must be recognized that 
there are many small scale and high frequency phenomena in the atmosphere, such 
as the Madden Julian Oscillation, that can influence the pressures at stations 
                                                 
35 See Gray and Riser (2015, 4341). 
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involved in forming the SOI but that do not reflect the SOI itself. (Trenberth 1997, 
2773) 
The Southern Oscillation Index is an index for the state of pressure and sea surface temperature 
fields in the Pacific and Indian oceans. Particular values for the SOI would indicate a change in 
the Southern Oscillations, and as a consequence the occurrence of ENSO. Trenberth is stating that 
a SOI only based on a time series coming only from two spatial locations (at the western boundary–
–Darwin––and in the center––Tahiti––) could not provide reliable values for ENSO due to 
contamination from noise at other scales.  
To have a better index for ENSO, enough data needs to be systematically collected in order 
to separate the genuine phenomenon from noise or signals at other scales. Table 3.1 is a chart of 
the scales of observations developed by scientists at TOGA to obtain reliable monthly averages of 
the parameters of interest. 
 
Table 3.1. TOGA data requirements. From McPhaden et al. (1998). Reprinted with permission from AGU. 
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While this arrangement changed and still changes today, it illustrates the importance of the 
assumption that phenomena (and other components) occur at characteristic spatiotemporal scales 
and the individuation of a signal at a particular scale is a crucial step for identifying phenomena 
from data. The assumption does in fact lie at the basis of how we choose to lay out an observation 
network.  
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Figure 3.4. TOGA in situ ocean observing system. From McPhaden et al. (1998). Reprinted with permission from 
AGU. 
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The TOGA data collection experiment and its analysis lead to important developments in 
the characterization of ENSO, which eventually lead to the definition of ENSO given at the 
beginning of this section. In their 1997 research note, Barnston et al. suggest that regions 
previously thought to be relevant for identifying early components of ENSO might have been 
chosen only because of their convenience for data collection (Barnston et al. 1997, 368). 36 
However, new data collected in the years of implementation of the TOGA experiment and data 
collected subsequently by the array allowed for a clearer analysis and a new and better outlook on 
the dynamical fields associated with ENSO (Barnston et al. 1997, 371). For example, a region in 
the Pacific labeled as “region 4” did not show a clear signal because it is a region in which there 
is a high degree of noise and low degree of variability (Barnston et al. 1997, 377). This means that 
the scale of the phenomenon was not clearly identifiable in that region when scarce data was 
available.  
The role of the scale existence assumption in the data to phenomena inference thus is the 
following: it serves at as a guide for scientists to identify the main components of the system, in 
order to obtain a satisfactory characterization of the phenomenon. In the case of ENSO, this 
assumption is at the basis of Bjerknes’ identification of the correlation between atmospheric and 
oceanic components of ENSO, which lead to various physical descriptions of the dynamics of 
ENSO. Later, the identification of a dominant scale of variability lead to the identification of 
critical areas of maximum variability for parameters associated with ENSO, which today defines 
the occurrence of an ENSO event. The TOGA experiment was instrumental: it provided a solid 
empirical basis for individuating the scale at which ENSO occurs. 
                                                 
36 See also McPhaden et al. (1998). For a general overview on ENSO definitions, see Trenberth 
(1997). 
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3.3 ARAKAWA AND SCHUBERT: THE ASSUMPTIONS IN THE THEORY TO 
PHENOMENA INFERENCE 
The scale existence and scale separation assumptions also feature prominently in the theory-to-
phenomena inference. In this section I will focus on the scale separation assumption. This 
assumption relies on the scale existence assumption in so far as a phenomenon has to exist at a 
characteristic scale in order to observe a separation for a phenomenon at another scale.  
In atmospheric dynamics, the scale separation assumption usually separates two 
components of a dynamical system, identifying principal and secondary ones. The secondary 
component is considered a disturbance on the large scale component, and that these disturbances 
occur on a scale much smaller than the larger scale. The disturbances that occur on the smaller 
scale can be parametrized, i.e. the details of their dynamics can effectively be suppressed in the 
large scale model. This allows scientists to isolate certain principal (relevant) components of the 
large scale model from smaller scale ones that are not directly relevant for describing its 
dynamics.37 I will now analyze the role of the scale separation assumption in the parametrization 
of the dynamical details of organized cumulus convection in large scale phenomena, such as 
hurricanes and squall lines.38 I will give a technical summary of the use and role of the scale 
separation assumption, while the philosophical significance of this parametrization scheme will be 
analyzed in more detail in the next chapter.  
The most influential cloud parametrization scheme was introduced by Arakawa and 
Schubert (1974). While this parametrization scheme is used in numerical rather than analytic 
models of the atmosphere, it should still be regarded as an instance of the theory to phenomena 
                                                 
37 I will expand on the epistemic significance of parametrization for modeling in the next 
chapter. 
38 A squall line is a band of storms and winds associated with cold fronts. 
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inference, as its derivation is mostly theoretical: Arakawa and Schubert explicitly state that their 
effort is directed at providing a theoretical framework for a parametrization that had previously 
been obtained with “a high degree of empiricism and intuition” (Arakawa and Schubert 1974, 674). 
Organized cumulus convection is a mesoscale process (it can be observed at the mesoscale) 
and occurs when a number of cumulus clouds are present within a larger scale system. A central 
aspect of its modeling is how to account for clouds and their cumulative behavior. Should each 
cloud be modeled individually, or can the collective behavior of the clouds be parametrized in 
terms of variables of the large scale system? In this section I will show that there is not a simple 
or unique answer to this question.  
While it is recognized that processes occur in clouds at many different scales, and that it is 
important to eventually understand and model all such processes, the parametrization is not merely 
sought for mathematical convenience, but has specific epistemic motivations. These motivations 
are in part to isolate and understand the recurrent behavior of organized convection at the scale at 
which it occurs. As a matter of fact, Arakawa and Schubert claim that modeling each singular 
cumulus cloud, a scale smaller than the one of organized cumulus convection, would be 
counterproductive for gaining knowledge about the target system: 
It should be emphasized here that the need for parametrizations is not limited to 
“numerical” models. Formulating the statistical behavior of small sale processes is 
needed for understanding large scale phenomena regardless of whether we use 
numerical, theoretical, or conceptual models. Even under a hypothetical situation 
in which we have a model that resolves all scales, it alone does not automatically 
give us an understanding of scale interactions. Understanding inevitably requires 
simplifications, including various levels of “parametrizations”, either explicitly or 
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implicitly, which are quantitative statements on the statistical behavior of the 
processes involved. Parametrizations thus have their own scientific merits. 
(Arakawa 2004, 2496; my emphasis)  
Parametrizations suppress degrees of freedom that are irrelevant for the purpose of isolating and 
understanding the behavior of the system of interest. Parametrizations also allow scientists to 
isolate phenomena and their components in order to study the way phenomena interact with other 
phenomena at different scales. The suppression of these degrees of freedom, therefore, is not only 
necessary because of computational constraints. As Arakawa points out, a model that resolves all 
scales, including the one at which cloud microphysics becomes relevant, does not necessarily 
provide a better model, i.e. a model that satisfactorily represents phenomena of interest or that 
provides reliable quantitative predictions. 
Isolating components at their characteristic scales does two things: it identifies relevant 
components of the phenomenon of interest and it contributes to successful modeling of the 
interaction across components at different scales. One needs to be able to isolate components at 
particular scales to model how these components interact. The isolation of components, according 
to Arakawa, occurs by individuating the statistical behavior of small scale processes.  
The scale separation assumption can be broken down into two components, one purely 
related to spatial scale of the system of interest, and the other related to the temporal scale of the 
system of interest. Both are presented in the argument found in Arakawa and Shubert’s 1974 
original contribution. The first component is the spatial averaging assumption and provides the 
spatial scale (the size of a unit horizontal area) for the averaging of the collective behavior of 
cumulus clouds. The scale suggested by Arakawa and Schubert has to “be large enough to contain 
an ensemble of cumulus clouds but small enough to cover only a fraction of a large-scale 
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disturbance” (Arakawa and Schubert 1974, 675). This means that the ensemble of cumulus clouds 
has to cover an area of the large scale system that is small relative to the system itself, but this area 
still has to contain multiple cumulus clouds.  Further, within this area, the total area covered by a 
horizontal cross section of cumulus clouds cover must be small, i.e. within the cloud ensemble, 
the relative area occupied by clouds (versus cloud-free area) also has to be small (Arakawa and 
Schubert 1974, 677). This assumption somewhat constraints the applicability of the 
parametrization: the organized cumulus convection has to be dense enough (or not too dense) in 
order for this assumption to be satisfied. The area obtained by this assumption is what is sometimes 
called in the scientific and philosophical literature “Representative Element Volume” (see 
Batterman (2013, 262) and references therein), and getting the scale of this volume right is crucial 
for the physical argument that describes the process at that scale. 
The time scale related assumption is that the time scale at which the convective processes 
of the cumulus clouds adjust to changes in the large scale environment (the phenomenon of 
interest) is sufficiently shorter than the time scale of the phenomenon (Arakawa and Schubert 1974, 
691). 
The spatial averaging assumption and the time scale separation assumption are at the basis 
of a physical quasi-equilibrium balance argument. This is a balance of the convective processes of 
the cloud with the large scale constraints posed on the convection itself (Arakawa and Schubert, 
1974, 675, 691; Yano and Plant 2012, 7). At an appropriate scale, the cloud physics is in 
equilibrium with its environment (the large scale system), and, as a consequence, details of the 
cloud physics can be ignored. This argument is very similar to the notion of thermodynamic 
balance (Yano and Plant 2012, 6) and the continuum hypothesis in fluid dynamics (Emanuel 2007). 
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The (somewhat more) detailed argument is the following. A convective process involves 
the adiabatic lifting and sinking of a fluid element. The two parameters that describe this process 
are the vertical momentum 𝜌 𝑤𝑐  (where 𝜌 is the fluid density 𝑤𝑐  is the vertical velocity) and the 
buoyancy 𝑏. This process occurs only for a fraction of the total area of the phenomenon, namely 
the fraction covered by cumulus clouds 𝜎𝑐. The spatial averaging assumption is applicable if  𝜎𝑐 ≪
1 which means that the area covered by cumulus clouds must be smaller than the total area taken 
into consideration. The total convective kinetic energy that is generated by the cumulus cloud 
ensemble is quantified by 
𝐴 = ∫
𝜎𝑐 𝜌 𝑤𝑐
?̂?
𝑧𝑇
𝑧𝐵
 𝑏 𝑑𝑧 
where A is called the “cloud work function” (Arakawa and Schubert 1974, 687), 𝑧𝐵 and 𝑧𝑇 the 
cloud base and top respectively, and ?̂? is a normalization factor, the rate of vertical mass transport 
of the convective process. The rate of change of kinetic energy of an ensemble of clouds is given 
by the following general equation 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝐴𝜆 = 𝐹𝐿,𝜆 − 𝐷𝑐,𝜆 
Where 𝜆 accounts for the cloud type, 𝐹𝐿,𝜆  is the rate at which 𝐴𝜆  is generated by large scale process 
(the environment/large scale phenomenon) and 𝐷𝑐,𝜆 is the rate at which 𝐴𝜆  is consumed by the 
convective process, i.e. the kinetic energy used up by the cloud during convection (see Yano and 
Plant 2012, 7). 
The kinetic energy consumption rate of the convective process is given by 
𝐷𝑐,𝜆 = ∑ 𝐾𝜆𝜆′𝑀𝜆′̂
𝜆′
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where 𝐾𝜆𝜆′is the rate at which each unit of cloud base mass flux for the cloud type 𝜆′ contributes 
to the reduction of 𝐴𝜆 . 39 The convective quasi equilibrium assumption, a crucial assumption that 
provides the closure for Arakawa and Schubert’s parametrization scheme, is 
 
𝐹𝐿,𝜆 − 𝐷𝑐,𝜆 = 0 
which means that the cloud is in equilibrium with its environment: 
𝑑
𝑑𝑡
𝐴𝜆 = 0 . This approximation 
can be applied only if the time scale of the adjustment processes of the cloud 𝜏𝐴𝐷𝐽 is much smaller 
than the time scale of the large scale process 𝜏𝐿𝑆. This is the time scale separation assumption 
mentioned above, and according to Arakawa and Schubert, it is “an assumption on 
parametrizability, if by parametrization we mean a relation between the properties of the cumulus 
ensemble and the large-scale variables at the same instant.” (Arakawa and Schubert 1974, 691). 
The point is that the collective behavior of the cumulus ensemble can be considered to vary (quasi) 
instantaneously with the large scale system, and as a consequence, the small scale processes that 
occur in every single cumulus cloud are negligible. 
We have seen how the scale separation assumption (both in space, where the cumulus 
ensemble occupies a small area compared to the whole system (𝜎𝑐 ≪ 1), and in time, where 𝜏𝐴𝐷𝐽 
≪  𝜏𝐿𝑆) is at the basis of the physical argument of quasi equilibrium of the cloud ensemble with 
the large scale process that allows scientists to ignore small scale cloud processes in a dynamical 
description of the large scale process. In so far as the cloud ensemble maintains properties that are 
in quasi equilibrium with the large scale, smaller scale cloud physics will not have any direct 
                                                 
39 These parameters, too, represent smaller scale cloud processes and their interaction with the 
environment. For example, the vertical mass flux in a cloud ?̂? depends on smaller scale 
processes within the cloud. These parametrizations also rely assumptions about what processes 
become relevant at what spatiotemporal scales. 
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relevance for changes in the large scale. As a consequence, the scale separation assumption 
contributes to the theory to phenomena inference in so far as it isolates the large scale phenomenon 
of interest from irrelevant physics at smaller scales.  
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4.0 STRUCTURAL UNCERTAINTY: TARGET SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
So far, I have illustrated the importance of the scale existence assumption and the scale separation 
assumption for the identification of phenomena as targets. The discussion so far has touched on 
issues of idealization and abstraction. I will now show that my approach of analyzing philosophical 
issues from the perspective of target system identification can be helpful for discussing another 
philosophical issue: the nature of uncertainty in scientific modeling. 
Uncertainty is an aspect of climate science that has drawn increasingly more attention in 
recent years (see, for example, Parker 2006, 2010, 2011; Frigg et al. 2013, 2014; Stainforth, Allen, 
et al. 2007; Stainforth, Downing, et al. 2007; Knutti 2008). Uncertainty also is an aspect of climate 
science that is particularly important epistemically and socio-politically. On one hand, there is a 
limited and problematic sense in which experiments can be performed to validate and confirm our 
models.40 On the other hand, the climate directly affects individuals and society world-wide, and 
taking the changes in climates and our current knowledge concerning the climate into account is 
an important part of policy-making, both at national and international levels.  
                                                 
40 See the debate between Parker (2009a) and Lloyd (2010) and the papers by Steele and Werndl 
(2013, 2015) and references therein. For general issues concerning simulations as experiments 
see Parker (2009b) and Morrison (2009). 
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The institution that takes care of the socio-political and scientific interface is the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). One of their tasks is to summarize the state 
of the science and communicate it to policymakers in the “Summary for Policymakers.” In these 
summaries, uncertainty is usually communicated in terms of likelihoods of events occurring and 
confidence in statements about the climate. For example, the guidance note for lead authors of the 
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report introduces confidence in the following way: 
Confidence in the validity of a finding is based on the type, amount, quality, and 
consistency of evidence (e.g., data, mechanistic understanding, theory, models, 
expert judgment) and the degree of agreement. (Mastrandrea et al. 2010, 1) 
This statement identifies many different sources of uncertainty, mostly related to data and to the 
models used to obtain prediction. The sources of uncertainty have been discussed by philosophers 
and scientists alike, and they be broadly categorized as data uncertainty, parameter uncertainty and 
structural uncertainty (Parker 2010). Data uncertainty is uncertainty about the reliability of data 
collection and analysis methods, and uncertainty about whether this data is accurately representing 
the relevant state of the climate when it is fed into large numerical models (also called General 
Circulation Models). Parameter uncertainty is uncertainty about the reliability of the empirical 
values assigned to the parameters in a model. Finally, structural uncertainty is uncertainty about 
the structure of the equations of a model. The structure of the model is understood, in this case, as 
the number of mathematical objects that represent the target and the relation between these objects. 
This chapter will focus on structural uncertainty. 
There are several important reasons to be interested in uncertainty in general, and in 
structural uncertainty in particular. Scientists and philosophers describe structural uncertainty as 
one of the types of uncertainty that is particularly hard to assess (see Knutti 2008; Stainforth, Allen, 
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et al. 2007, Stainforth, Downing, et al. 2007; Parker 2010, 2011; Frigg et al. 2013, 2014). So, one 
is interested in asking whether there is a way of characterizing structural uncertainty in order to 
obtain reliable uncertainty assessments. Further, structural uncertainty is an epistemic, 
representational problem. In particular, philosophers are interested in asking how the construction 
of a model is epistemically justified and the extent to which models can accurately represent their 
targets. Last, policy makers, scientists and philosophers are interested in articulating an account of 
structural uncertainty that allow for better communication across the different disciplines. This 
point has been clearly made by Smith and Stern (2011) and by Stainforth, Downing, et al.: 
A two-way communication between climate scientists and users of climate science 
is . . . of fundamental importance. Only by understanding the needs of different 
[policy] sectors can the science be usefully directed and communicated. Only by 
understanding the conditions, assumptions and uncertainties of model based 
statements about future climate can decision makers evaluate the relevance of the 
information and make informed, if subjective, assessments of risk. (Stainforth, 
Downing, et al. 2007, 2165, my emphasis.) 
Stainforth, Downing, et al. claim that policy makers and scientists need to be able to clearly state 
and assess the uncertainties that arise in models. These uncertainties are tied to the conditions 
under which model based statements are made.41 One such condition is the range for which a 
model can be used to obtain reliable predictions—be these various emission scenarios, parameters 
values, etc. Uncertainties are also tied to the assumptions of the model based statements, which 
are the idealizing and abstracting assumptions that scientists introduce in their models. An account 
                                                 
41 Model based statements can be either predictive statements about the future of the earth’s 
climate or statements that reflect the scientists’ understanding of the physics of the climate. 
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of structural uncertainty that highlights the sources of uncertainty would allow for confident 
decision making even without entirely eliminating the sources of uncertainty. Part of the challenge 
of formulating such an account is to individuate the epistemic and representational constraints that 
are tied to the conditions and assumptions of model based statements.  
 In this chapter, I will start by reviewing some of the existing literature on structural 
uncertainty. I will argue that while philosophers have identified an important problem, their 
approach misses some crucial points. Next, I will develop a set of desiderata aimed at addressing 
the gaps in the current literature. These desiderata are also aimed at guiding the development of an 
account of structural uncertainty that is useful to scientists, philosophers and policymakers. Finally, 
I will start sketching an account of structural uncertainty that addresses these desiderata. This 
account will be approached by starting from the assumptions that are involved in identifying 
targets and building models of the targets.  
4.2 CURRENT ACCOUNTS 
Two philosophers that have been discussing structural uncertainty explicitly are Frigg et al. (2014) 
and Parker (2006, 2010, 2011). Their accounts are representative of most of the scientific literature 
on the topic. Reviewing these accounts will serve the purpose of clarifying what we mean by 
structural uncertainty and highlight the deficiencies of the current debate on the topic. 
 Frigg and his colleagues develop the discussion of structural uncertainty in the context of 
nonlinear models. In order to focus on structural uncertainty, they assume that the modeler has 
perfect knowledge of parameter values and no uncertainty concerning the collection, analysis and 
input of data into computer models. In their view: 
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A model has [structural uncertainty] if the model dynamics differ from the 
dynamics in the target system. If a nonlinear model has only the slightest [structural 
uncertainty], then its ability to generate decision-relevant probability predictions is 
compromised. (Frigg et al. 2014, 32) 
This statement implies that for non-linear systems, even slightest change in model structure can 
compromise ability to generate decision-relevant predictions. The authors call this the “hawkmoth 
effect” (Frigg et al. 2014, 39). This effect is similar to sensitive dependence to initial conditions 
for chaotic systems: as Frigg et al. say, for both cases, it does not matter how close the model 
structure or the initial data is to the structure or data that will allow the model to make accurate 
predictions––small deviations in model structure or data will lead to predictions that are misleading. 
A question that can be raised of this account is whether there are cases for which this effect 
can be managed, or whether there is a way of determining whether we are in a regime where this 
effect can be severe or not. Frigg et al. are pessimistic about being able to be able to obtain a non-
arbitrary measure on a class of models that would allow scientists to determine which models are 
trustworthy and which are not–their suggestion is to discard probabilities as meaningful tools for 
assessing predictions (Frigg et al. 2014, 57). However, they overlook the target identification and 
model building process in their discussion. 
 Another account that is more directly addressing practical issues in climate modeling is 
provided by Parker (2006, 2010, 2011). Parker says, “Structural uncertainty often refers to 
uncertainty about the form that modeling equations should take” (Parker 2010, 265). This means 
that structural uncertainty is uncertainty about the number of mathematical objects that need to be 
taken into account in order to accurately model a target. To clarify her account of structural 
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uncertainty, Parker points out several sources of structural uncertainty. In particular, structural 
uncertainty arises when 
i. Physical processes of interest are not described by well-established theories. 
ii. The representation of physical processes involves simplifications and 
idealizations, because of theoretical or pragmatic constraints. 
iii. Processes need to be parametrized, and there is no best way to parametrize 
a process. (Parker 2010, 264–265) 
As in the account provided by Frigg et al., structural uncertainty in Parker’s case is an unavoidable 
aspect of modeling. Simplifications, idealizations and parametrizations are part and parcel of 
mathematically modeling the climate. A question that arises for the use of simplifications and 
idealization is whether they are introduced in such a way that uncertainty can be mitigated. What 
is the role of idealizations and simplifications for obtaining the model-based statements mentioned 
by Stainforth et al.’s quote in the previous section? In order to understand how uncertainty is tied 
to these modeling practices, one needs a more in-depth discussion of what limitations these 
idealizations and simplifications introduce.  
Further, the Navier-Stokes equations (which contain some parameters themselves) are not 
analytically solvable. 42 This implies that the spatiotemporal grid on which these equations are 
solved numerically also requires that further parametrizations be introduced in the model. In order 
to understand the importance of parametrizations in models, a more detailed description of the role 
of parametrization in models is needed.43 A parameter, in general, can be understood as a black 
                                                 
42 The Navier-Stokes equations are a set of fluid dynamical equations that lie at the basis of 
modeling of the atmosphere. Climate models involve a lot more than the use of these equations. 
43 A full account of the use of parametrizations in mathematical modeling would be an extremely 
worthwhile project but is beyond the scope of this paper. For a brief overview, see Edwards 
(2010, Ch.13). 
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box that incorporates finer detail of the processes represented in the model. This finer detail is 
usually thought to not matter much, and to the extent it does, it is represented as an effective 
parameter the value of which can usually be measured empirically. For example, consider the 
Navier-Stokes momentum equation: 
𝜌
𝐷𝑢
𝐷𝑡
=  −∇?̅? +  𝜇∇2𝑢 +
1
3
μ ∇(∇ ∙ u) +  𝜌𝑔 
In this equation, the parameters are ρ, p and μ. These are density, pressure and viscosity 
respectively. Each parameter represents a type of molecular motion and/or interaction that can, for 
the purpose of modeling fluid, be represented by the cumulative behavior of the molecules44. In 
other words, certain fine details of molecular motion are not relevant for the description of their 
cumulative behavior, and the parameters suppress these details into one term. In the case of the 
Navier-Stokes equations, these parameters are extremely effective.45 It would be therefore too 
quick to assert that parameters introduce uncertainty. Rather, the challenge that arises to assess 
when parameters introduce uncertainty in models is to understand when certain details can be 
considered irrelevant, and when instead they need to be taken into account.  
 In order to address some of the lacunae that exist in Frigg et al.’s and Parker’s accounts, 
the assumption that we can take the model as a given needs to be left behind. The way 
simplifications, idealizations and parametrizations contribute to uncertainty depends on how they 
are introduced in models. They also are an indication of the domain of applicability of the model. 
The applicability of a model depends, as a matter of fact, on its intended target, and as a 
consequence, focusing on how targets are identified is a promising strategy to investigate how 
                                                 
44 An interesting related debate concerns reductionism. See Kim (1992, 1999) and Batterman 
(2009) for an overview of the arguments for and against the possibility of reductionism in 
science. 
45 The Navier-Stokes equations are currently the best tool for modeling fluids. 
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uncertainty can enter the modeling process. As I have argued in chapters 2 and 3, important 
assumptions that are involved in the target identification process are about the scale at which the 
target occurs, and whether targets occurring at different scales are spatiotemporally separated 
enough to be considered phenomena that can be modeled independently of one another. The use 
of these assumptions is crucial in order to identify whether details at other scales can indeed be 
parametrized or not. To give an account of structural uncertainty that thoroughly reflects the 
modeling practice, thus, we need to focus on how targets are identified and the scale dependence 
of targets.  
4.3 DESIDERATA 
An adequate account of structural uncertainty should not only address the scientific motivations, 
such as being able to manage and assess uncertainty but should also address the philosophical 
motivations (How is any particular model epistemically justified?) and socio-political motivations 
(How can scientists and policy makers communicate effectively about uncertainty?) that drive the 
interest in providing such an account. One of the reasons that drives this interest is to develop an 
account of structural uncertainty that is useful—an account that will allow the interested party to 
provide a clear assessment of this kind of uncertainty. In this section I will describe three desiderata 
that reflect these motivations. 
Epistemic Reliability. An adequate account of structural uncertainty should indicate when 
a model is epistemically reliable. This desideratum addresses both the scientific and the 
philosophical motivations. There are two main ways in which epistemic reliability can be specified. 
These are 
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i. Specification of the conditions under which the model makes accurate predictions.  
ii. Indication of when the model is accurately representing target phenomena.  
The first item concerns the extent to which a model is applicable to the world. For example, a 
model that is used for daily weather prediction is not going to be reliable––will be very uncertain–
–for making monthly forecasts, and vice versa. The second item concerns representational 
accuracy: an adequate account of structural uncertainty should indicate when phenomena are 
properly identified and how thoroughly and perspicuously the model manifests the phenomena 
and their interactions. In other words, representational accuracy captures the extent to which a 
model represents the regularities that we observe in the world and whether the modeler has an 
adequate explanation for it. 
Sources of Uncertainty. An adequate account of structural uncertainty should reveal 
sources of uncertainty in the model. This criterion addresses the philosophical motivations for such 
an account: it should highlight which aspects of the model construction and justification process 
are likely to introduce uncertainty. Two ways in which sources of structural uncertainty can be 
revealed are: 
i. Shedding light on the assumptions made in constructing the model that generate 
structural uncertainty. 
ii. Indicating the domains of inapplicability given the assumptions. 
The first item concerns the modeling construction and justification process: a good account of 
uncertainty should identify what can introduce uncertainty. The use of modeling assumptions is 
directly tied to Parker’s point about the use of simplifications and idealizations. Some simplifying 
and idealizing assumptions are going to be conducive to building a reliable model, while some will 
not. The second item is related to how the use of various assumptions can constrain the 
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applicability of a model. For example, given some simplifying and/or idealizing assumption, a 
model will be reliable for one domain or purpose but not reliable for another. In other words, this 
is a criterion that requires an adequate account of structural uncertainty to provide an explanation 
for the unreliability of the model. 
 Policy Relevance. Last, an adequate account of structural uncertainty should indicate how 
structural uncertainty can vary for different questions asked by the policy makers. As Stainforth et 
al. suggest, the identification of the sources of uncertainty is a two-way process, from the scientist 
to the policy maker and from the policy maker to the scientist. A clear communication of the 
expectations from and the limits of models should make the uncertainty identification process 
clearer. Expectations from models may concern the kind of phenomena, spatial and/or temporal 
scales that the model should predict reliably. Limits of models similarly concern the limits on the 
range of predictions that can reliably be made with those models. Identifying these expectations 
and limits does not mean that uncertainty will be eliminated. Nevertheless, an account of structural 
uncertainty that meets these criteria can reduce the so-called “unknown unknowns” and shed more 
light on the “known unknowns”. Reducing the number of unknown unknowns should help the 
policy maker differentiate between the cases for which a sound assessment of risk can be carried 
out and when there just is not enough information to make such an assessment.  
The criteria that I have identified are the guide for developing an adequate account of 
uncertainty. I understand that these represent more an ideal towards which an account should strive 
rather than criteria that are easily attainable. Nevertheless, these criteria are best addressed when 
studying scientific (mathematical) modeling from the perspective of target identification. 
Understanding the assumptions that are involved in selecting targets and building models thereof 
will help the philosopher develop an account of when a model can be trusted (epistemic reliability), 
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why a model cannot be trusted (sources of uncertainty) and how structural uncertainty depends on 
questions asked by the policy makers (policy relevance). 
4.4 A NEW ACCOUNT 
I will now show that by taking into account how assumptions about scales are used in identifying 
target systems and constructing models, we can start providing an account of structural uncertainty 
that meets the needs of scientists, philosophers and policy makers.  
In climate science, we want to identify phenomena, model their behavior, and model the 
way they interact. As I have already discussed in this dissertation, phenomena relevant for climate 
modeling occur at many different scales. This point has been made clearly by the meteorologist 
Kerry Emanuel (1986).46 While this is an important aspect of climate science, there are good 
reasons to believe that this is a problem that is not confined to this discipline. For example, I have 
shown in chapter 1 that Levin (1992) has emphasized the importance of the concept of scale for 
identifying ecological phenomena. Loeb and Imara (2017) have recently made a similar case for 
astrophysics. 
4.4.1 Parametrizations 
An example of the scale dependence of phenomena in climate science, as I have discussed in 
chapter 3, arises for the case of modeling hurricanes. Scientists are interested in modeling their 
formation, development, trajectories and their dissipation into tropical storms. At the same time, 
we are interested in modeling smaller scale phenomena, like clouds–which can be modeled 
                                                 
46 See chapter 2. 
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individually or as parts of hurricanes. Hurricanes and clouds are described by different physics, 
yet they are both important for climate modeling. This is part of the more general issue of 
identifying and representing phenomena at many different scales, and incorporating the different 
physics dominates at those different scales. In climate science phenomena occur across 10 order 
of magnitude, from 10s of meters to the entire globe, and from seconds to centuries.  
The task of identifying phenomena at different scales, modeling their physics and the 
interaction of these phenomena at different scales is particularly complex. One of the most 
important goals of climate scientists is to make predictions about how climate phenomena will 
change over time and how changes in phenomena at different spatiotemporal scales affect one 
another: for example, scientists are interested in knowing how global average temperature increase 
(a large-scale phenomenon) will affect smaller scale phenomena like hurricane frequency and 
intensity in the Caribbean (Emanuel 1999, 2005). For this reason, understanding scale dependence 
and scale interaction is crucial for obtaining reliable predictions.  
 As mentioned above, climate models are numerical models that are solved by large 
computers. In order to solve numerical models, the equations of the models that describe how 
phenomena of interest will change over time will need to be discretized. To complicate matters 
further, the way the discretization is carried out also depends on the phenomena we are interested 
in. For example, if we want to predict how global sea level increase will affect tidal increase in the 
long term, we will chose a scale of discretization that is small enough to capture the important 
information about tidal increase but ignores oceanic phenomena at smaller spatiotemporal scales 
like tsunamis.47 In general, when placing out models on a spatiotemporal grid so that we can use 
                                                 
47 Tsunamis only temporarily increase sea levels and related tides, whereas the sea level increase 
due to the melting of ice has much more long term effects on the height of tides.  
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computers to make predictions, the scale of the grid is a function of the characteristic scale of the 
phenomenon of interest. 48  
A question that follows naturally from this is: why can we ignore details at smaller scales 
when we are interested in large scale phenomena? And why don’t we always use the most fine-
grained model? A first answer has already been hinted at in chapter three. In discussing the role of 
parametrization schemes, I mentioned the remarks on this topic by the atmospheric scientist 
Arakawa. For easy reference, here is the important passage quoted before:  
Even under a hypothetical situation in which we have a model that resolves all 
scales, it alone does not automatically give us an understanding of scale interactions. 
Understanding inevitably requires simplifications, including various levels of 
“parametrizations” . . . Parametrizations thus have their own scientific merits. 
(Arakawa 2004, 2496) 
Here, Arakawa stresses the importance of understanding how phenomena occurring at different 
scales behave and how they interact with phenomena at other scales. In order to do this, we need 
to isolate phenomena from their environment, which is accomplished by ignoring those parts of 
the world that are considered to be, to a certain extent, irrelevant for the description of the 
phenomenon—a task performed by parameters.  As a consequence, one of the reasons we do not 
use the most fine-grained model is that we need to isolate phenomena of interest, and to do this we 
use parametrizations. 49  An important corollary of this statement is that, contra Parker, 
                                                 
48 Note that the computational grid scale is not always one-to-one with the REV that is used to 
obtain parametrizations. The relation between parametrization and computational grid is an 
interesting issue that contributes to structural uncertainty in significant ways. The epistemic 
significance of the relation between parametrization and computational grid is discussed, among 
other topics, in Wilson (2017). I thank Mark Wilson for drawing my attention to this issue. 
49 I have argued for this claim extensively in chapters 2 and 3. 
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parametrizations are not always problematic: in many cases they can reduce structural uncertainty 
by providing theoretical insight.  
In fact, when parametrizations are used to isolate phenomena, they highlight the relevant 
components of a target system by suppressing the irrelevant details occurring at other scales. By 
highlighting the relevant components of a phenomenon, parametrizations are a tool for advancing 
theoretical understanding of the phenomena, and reduce uncertainty that is tied to lack of such 
understanding.  
To fully appreciate Arakawa’s point, it is helpful to further look into the process of 
parametrization in climate science. One of the most important underlying assumptions of the 
parametrization process is the scale separation assumption. This is the assumption that says that if 
two processes occur at spatial and temporal scales that are sufficiently separated, then they can be 
modeled separately. This is the assumption that underlies the identification of target systems at 
different scales: finding situations where the scale separation assumption holds is a central part of 
identifying phenomena and constructing tractable models (Baldissera Pacchetti 2017). I would like 
to note that the scale separation assumption is neither a sufficient or necessary condition for target 
system identification, but an important widespread heuristic. 
Understanding the central role of the scale separation assumption in climate modeling 
offers a more satisfactory account of structural uncertainty: when the scale separation assumption 
is not clearly applicable, the exclusion of details via parametrization schemes is not well justified. 
The lack of a satisfactory justification for a parametrization scheme leads to structural uncertainty 
as we do not know if the mathematical object used to model an aspect of the world does so 
accurately. In what follows, I am going to discuss the philosophical implications for structural 
uncertainty of the Arakawa and Schubert parametrization scheme I have discussed in chapter 3. 
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For the sake of clarity, I will briefly repeat the most salient details of the physics of that case. I 
will then illustrate how understanding the role of this assumption offers a more satisfactory account 
of structural uncertainty.  
When scientists want to isolate phenomena like hurricanes, they want to know whether 
they need to model the microphysics of individual clouds within a hurricane or whether they can 
ignore the individual clouds and model the cloud behavior collectively. Further, scientists are 
interested in how the collection of clouds interacts with its macroenvironment–for example, a 
hurricane. Groups of clouds are pretty stable structures in hurricanes, so scientists can model the 
clouds as a group, understand this stable collective behavior, and, while we are at it, save some 
computing power. 
One important way to model the stability of a group of clouds within a larger structure is 
to relate the statistical effects of the cloud microphysical processes to the macrophysical ones: the 
processes that occur within a cloud to the collective changes that occur in the group of clouds and 
the changes in the environment. The microphysical processes will be negligible if the changes in 
the physics of individual clouds occur at scales that are much smaller than the scale of the system 
they are part of. This assumption is the scale separation assumption: if there is enough scale 
separation between microphysical and macrophysical processes, then—if we are interested in 
modeling macrophysical processes—the microphysics can be ignored: the microphysics of the 
cloud is considered to be irrelevant for the physics of the interaction of the cloud with the 
macroenvironment.  
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Figure 4.1. Cloud and associated processes for which major uncertainties in formulation exist. 
From Arakawa (2004).  ©American Meteorological Society. Used with permission. 
 
The scale separation assumption is not just a mathematical construct that allows the 
scientist to eliminate some degrees of freedom from their models, but it also involves a physical 
justification of the physical processes involved. For the case discussed here, the physics that gets 
ignored are the processes that occur internally to each cloud, such as the conversion of humidity 
into rain droplets. What instead is related to the macroenvironment is the entrainment—collection 
of energy from the environment in the form of hot air and moisture—and the release of energy in 
the form of precipitation, as represented in Figure 4.1. These are the processes that are in balance 
with the macrophysics. The physical interpretation of the scale separation is that the internal 
microphysics can be considered to adjust virtually instantaneously to the changes in the 
macroenvironment. The temporal scale separation between the macrophysical and microphysical 
processes is so great, that in effect we can treat these two processes as being in balance. At this 
particular scale, when we “see” groups of clouds behaving this way, we can model the larger scale 
system as a closed dynamical system and effectively ignore the physics that occurs at smaller 
scales, because this physics does not matter for the description of this large-scale system.  
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 One should note, however, that this parametrization process is not only guided by 
theoretical and empirical considerations: Sometimes, the parametrization is guided by the size of 
the grid necessary to make our models numerically solvable. What guides parametrization in 
general is the relation between processes at different scales and their interaction. A smaller scale 
process is parameterized when it is not explicitly resolved in our climate models.  
4.4.2 Structural Uncertainty 
We have seen so far that the scale separation assumption is one of the key ingredients in justifying 
parametrization schemes used to isolate phenomena. As a consequence, whether a parametrization 
scheme introduces structural uncertainty in the model will partly depend on whether the use the 
scale separation assumption is warranted. If the justification for ignoring the physics is not valid, 
then we do not know whether we have made a legitimate move in model building. It also means 
that we do not know whether our system will need the explicit representation of the physics at 
smaller scales. From this starting point, we can begin providing an account of structural uncertainty 
that will meet the desiderata spelled out in section 4.3. 
 Structural uncertainty is uncertainty about whether the structure of the mathematical model 
accurately represents its target. Given role of the scale separation assumption in the Arakawa and 
Schubert parametrization scheme, we can say that structural uncertainty arises when one or more 
of the following conditions obtain: 
i. The scale separation assumption cannot be justified theoretically. 
ii. The scale separation assumption cannot be verified empirically. 
iii. Complex models do not reliably account for inter-scale interactions between 
different “closed system” models of phenomena. 
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Let me elaborate on these conditions. As I argued above, the application of the scale separation 
assumption is not just a mathematical construct used to eliminate degrees of freedom. In many 
cases, the use of this assumption is accompanied by a physical interpretation of the processes that 
are modeled explicitly, and the ones that are suppressed in a parameter. In the case of the 
parametrization described above, one can eliminate the microphysics of the cloud because, at the 
scale at which the cloud ensemble is modeled, the internal processes of the clouds are in balance 
with their surroundings. Further, the use of this assumption should be backed by data series: the 
separation in scale must be observable from an analysis of data collected at the scales of interest.50  
 The assumption also plays an important role for the mathematical structure of the model: 
it provides a “closure condition” for the set of equations that describe the target system.51 This role 
is what effectively separates the target system at the scale at which it is modeled from the details 
from the details at other scales. As Arakawa notes, having a closed set of equations will help 
scientists gain theoretical insight into the behavior of an ensemble of clouds. If the set of equations 
does so successfully, then it serves as a stepping stone for understanding the interaction of the 
ensemble of clouds with smaller and larger scale phenomena. On the other hand, lack of such 
understanding of inter-scale interactions can lead to structural uncertainty–as the interactions 
between different phenomena cannot be modeled reliably (or do not have a proper justification). 
                                                 
50 Yano and Plant (2012) have argued that scale separation for the time series of cloud 
precipitation cannot be verified empirically and problematize the concept of quasi-equilibrium as 
a physical justification for the Arakawa-Schubert parametrization scheme described above. This 
is a case where uncertainty can be highlighted by problematizing the use of the scale separation 
assumption. 
51 Closure conditions, in mathematics, are conditions that allow for the solution of a set of 
equations so that the number of free variables does not exceed the number of equations that are 
solved simultaneously. 
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This issue is particularly important in climate science, as phenomena can be observed to occur on 
many scales. 
4.4.3 Desiderata 
So far, I have argued that by paying attention to the identification of target systems and the 
assumptions that are involved in modeling the target we can start providing a more detailed account 
of when and where structural uncertainty can arise in the modeling process. For this account to be 
useful, however, it needs to satisfy the desiderata I have developed in section 4.3. 
 First of all, an adequate account of structural uncertainty should indicate when a model is 
epistemically reliable. In order to accomplish this, it needs to specify the conditions under which 
the model makes accurate predictions and accurately represents the target phenomena. My account 
satisfies this criterion by looking at the conditions under which structural uncertainty arises with 
respect to how the scale separation assumption is used to identify and model phenomena at 
particular scales. For example, when we have empirical validation and a theoretical interpretation 
of the use of the scale separation assumption, we can say that a model of the target is epistemically 
reliable.52 The use of the scale separation assumption can also serve as a platform for starting to 
answer more detailed questions about the reliability of a model. Scale separation has consequences 
for the conditions under which a model can make accurate predictions, for example: the model 
will only make accurate predictions for the scales at which phenomena are represented. One 
condition for which a model is accurately representing the target system is if the relevant scales 
are taken into account. 
                                                 
52 This is equivalent to a non vicious convergence of the theory to phenomena inference and data 
to phenomena inference as described in chapter 2. 
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 Second, an adequate account of structural uncertainty should reveal the sources of 
uncertainty in the model. Studying structural uncertainty from the perspective of target 
identification and model building allows the philosopher and the scientist to shed light on the 
assumptions made in constructing the model that generate structural uncertainty. The scale 
separation assumption is one such assumption: it plays a crucial role in eliminating irrelevant 
details from the model. As a consequence, an incorrect application of this assumption is a source 
of uncertainty. The content of this assumption also indicates the domains of inapplicability of a 
particular model given the assumptions. For example, the parameters that are introduced in a model 
will be a constraint on the kind of processes that are predicted by the model and the predictions 
that cannot be made by the model. Since the assumption effectively ignores details at smaller scales, 
reliably downscaling a particular model to be able to reliably represent smaller scale processes will 
not be an easy task. In order to downscale reliably, scientists will need to identify what phenomena 
are relevant at various smaller scales and how they interact with phenomena at other scales. A 
downscaling process that does not take theoretical constraints of the scale assumption into 
consideration will end up being unreliable (see, for example, the analysis by Frigg et al. (2013) of 
a worrying case of downscaling). 
 Third, an adequate account of structural uncertainty should address the needs of policy 
makers by indicating how structural uncertainty can vary for different policy related questions.  
For example, if we only need infrastructure that will withstand average rainfall over a large spatial 
region, the model on which we base our decisions can reliably ignore the short-distance causes of 
the rain accumulation, e.g. whether it is due to constant steady rainfall or extreme weather events 
(e.g. hurricanes). If, on the other hand, we need to protect a coastal area from extreme climate 
events, that model has considerable structural uncertainty about these phenomena and is not useful 
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for making policy decision. In sum, because of the details of the role of scale assumptions in 
modeling, this is an account of structural uncertainty that is useful in a way that existing accounts 
are not.   
4.5 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have argued that philosophers have identified an important problem in climate 
science; namely, how best to assess and communicate the nature of structural uncertainty in climate 
modeling. However, their characterization of structural uncertainty is not sufficiently well-
explicated. I have argued that a useful account of structural uncertainty should meet desiderata that 
are driven by scientific, philosophical and policy motivations. By focusing on the context of 
identifying phenomena and model building and highlighting the centrality of assumptions about 
scale separation, I have provided an account of structural uncertainty that addresses epistemic and 
representational problems facing scientists and philosophers as well as the socio-political needs of 
policy makers. This is not a complete account, but it highlights how a different strategy for 
answering philosophical questions can provide insights into scientific practice that have not been 
highlighted enough so far. 
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5.0 LEVELS AND SPATIOTEMPORAL SCALES 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapters, I have shown how target system identification, especially for the case of 
climate science, relies on assumptions about the scale at which phenomena occur. We have seen 
that these assumptions are empirical assumptions, and they are used to isolate relevant aspects of 
the world from irrelevant ones in order to build models. In other words, scale related assumptions 
are used by scientists as a tool to partition the world into phenomena that can inform scientists 
about the structure of the world. One way in which philosophers have also talked about the 
structure of the world and the way scientists describe and organize it is in terms of so-called “levels.”  
Levels are introduced to describe how scientist construct successful models about the world in 
spite of its complexity (Wimsatt 2007; Mitchell 2003, 2009) and how scientist use abstraction to 
achieve different modeling goals (Levins 1966, 1993, 2006). On these views, levels capture 
particular aspects of the world that constitute target systems for models, in such a way to be 
conducive to good modeling practices, whatever the measure for “goodness.” Levins (1966, 1993, 
2006) and Wimsatt (2007) mainly engage in a descriptive analysis of the concept of levels in the 
sciences. Sometimes this concept is also part of normative accounts (e.g., Mitchell 2003).53 In this 
                                                 
53 The debate about levels extends far beyond these authors, especially in the philosophy of 
biology. See for example the debate on reductionism in biology (Bringandt and Love 2017) or on 
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chapter, I focus on the role of the concept of level for models as described by these philosophers. 
The discussion of levels in this framework has both ontological and epistemic implications. 
5.2 CURRENT ACCOUNTS 
5.2.1 Levins on Levels 
Levins equates the notion of level to that of abstraction. Abstraction, in this case, is a process that 
is supposed to capture those aspects of the world that make up the target system chosen by the 
researcher.  
The clearest formulation of this concept can be found in Levins’ response to a critique of 
Orzak and Sober (1993). In the passage below, Levins is discussing the relation between his 
criterion of realism, the system of interest, the level of abstraction and the assumptions in a model: 
[T]he more closely the assumptions of a model correspond to the processes 
and level of abstraction being studied, the more realistic a model is; and the 
more closely the characteristics of interest correspond to the outcome of the 
model, the more realistic the model is. (Levins 1993, 549; my emphasis) 
This passage can be read in the following way. At different “levels of abstraction,” one can identify 
different processes, and for each of these processes a model can be more or less realistic depending 
on the assumptions made by the model. In this reading, a level of abstraction identifies a process 
to be studied, i.e. the target system that is modeled. 
                                                 
the units and levels of selection in evolutionary biology (Lloyd 2017). I will, however, rely on 
the authors cited in the main text as these are the most general contributions, and hence most 
pertinent to the purpose of the present essay. 
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 Levins’ characterization of the relation between the assumptions of a model and the level 
of abstraction resonates with the role of the scale related assumptions in identifying targets that 
has been discussed in the previous chapters. As I have argued in chapter 2, the scale related 
assumptions are abstracting assumptions. Assumptions about the scale of a target system guide 
scientists in determining the regularities that make up a phenomenon. In other words, these 
assumptions isolate the system of interest from irrelevant details–they are part of the assumptions 
that allow scientists to identify the level of abstraction that corresponds to a particular phenomenon. 
The level of abstraction described by Levins and the spatiotemporal scale at which a system is 
identified described in my work so far are therefore similar concepts. 
Moreover, Levins claims that there is no straightforward, monotonic relation between 
number of independent variables in a mathematical model and the realism of the model. As a 
matter of fact, realism can be reduced “when the added variables or connections among variables 
change the level of abstraction of a model” (Levins 1993, 549). Therefore, it is not always correct 
to say that a model that has more variables is more realistic than a model with fewer variables. The 
addition and subtraction of variables and the relations among them can have different effects in 
mathematical models, and this is dependent on the level of abstraction the model is supposed to 
capture. Variables can sometimes be added to include more representational detail. Relations 
between variables can be modified to represent processes differently. 54 These two modifications 
to mathematical models can increase their realism. These modifications can, however, in some 
cases, decrease realism. The cases in which this happens is when the modification of the model 
                                                 
54 An example of modification of relation between variables is changing a linear equation to a 
non-linear one. 
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deviates from the model’s intended level of abstraction, i.e. when the model does not represent the 
process captured by that level of abstraction.  
Again, this resonates with the role of scale related assumptions in justifying particular 
parametrization schemes used in modeling phenomena. As I have argued in chapters 3 and 4, 
suppressing details is not always a pragmatic move that subsequently needs to be corrected by 
explicitly modeling those details. If a particular parametrization scheme provides the closure for a 
model in such a way that the relevant components of a phenomenon are isolated, then, in Levins’ 
terms, the model is realistically modeling the phenomenon. Adding more variables from processes 
at, say, smaller scales would change the phenomenon and the level for which one is constructing 
a model. 
The context of application of the model also plays a role in determining the extent to which 
a model represents its target system. As a consequence, any ambiguity in interpreting Levins' 
concept of “level of abstraction” comes from at least two sources. The first source is his rejection 
of the analysis of realism of a model in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. The second 
source is the tension between the representational aspect of the model and the context in which the 
model is used. Levins’ concept of abstraction is in fact constrained both by the modeler’s interest 
(the context) and by the world (representational aspect). Levins’ murkiness on the issue of model 
representation is probably intentional. He claims that “formal analysis prefers to work with 
properties that belong to the object in itself, independent of its context” (Levins 1993, 549). 55  He 
claims that there are different ways in which model representation can add to considerations about 
                                                 
55 By mentioning formal analysis, Levins is referring to the standard analytical method employed 
by philosophers of finding necessary and sufficient conditions that their objects of analysis must 
satisfy. In this case, Levins is arguing against such an analysis of the realism desideratum. 
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mathematical models, and that formal analysis has limited the extent to which such considerations 
can be fruitful for philosophical analysis. 
As I read Levins, the ambiguity with respect to abstraction can be resolved in the following 
way: abstraction can be seen as capturing two different aspects of modeling. One aspect identifies 
the process in the world to be studied. In this sense, we abstract away from the rest of the world, 
and focus only on the system of interest. The other identifies the assumptions that will allow the 
scientist to decide which variables and parameters describing the system of interest will serve the 
purpose she is building the model for.  This reading clarifies our understanding of the realism 
desideratum: the scientist does not strive towards a unique, all comprehensive model when she 
strives for realism. Rather, a model becomes more and more realistic as it captures the relevant 
features of the world that make the process of interest a target system as such.  
Another insight into Levins’ analysis of abstraction is found in his distinction between 
abstractions of perspective and level. Levins’ levels and “abstraction of perspective” (Levins 2006, 
744) are in line with my interpretation given above. The “perspective” (Levins 2006, 744) is the 
initial question asked by the scientist (the context). The level of abstraction is the aspect of the 
world that has to be considered given one perspective (the representational aspect of the model in 
its context). Depending on the level, the system exhibits characteristic properties. These properties 
are captured in the model by means of dynamic variables and constant parameters (Levins 2006, 
744), which together with the context in which the model is applied to, contribute to the realism 
of the model. 
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Table 5.1. Abstractions of perspective, extent and level in fruit-fly ecology. Reprinted with permission from 
Springer Customer Service Centre GmbH: Springer Nature, Biology and Philosophy, Strategies of Abstraction, R. 
Levin, ©2006. 
 
 
Table 5.1 summarizes the abstractions of perspective and level introduced by Levins. The leftmost 
column describes the perspectives: these are the general questions that scientists can ask about 
objects in the world. The remaining columns capture the level: given a particular question, the 
levels constrain what can be considered as a target system, what is directly relevant to it, and what 
is irrelevant. For example, if a scientist is interested in the temperature tolerance of a species, e.g. 
the fly, the relevant horizontal (spatial) scale is that individual fly, and its mortality rate in a 
constant temperature environment over minutes to hours (the temporal scale). The details of the 
biology of the fly are not directly relevant and hence are represented by a constant parameter. 
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Levels of abstraction pick out the relevant target systems in the world that occur at characteristic 
spatiotemporal scales. 
 
5.2.2 Wimsatt on Levels 
Wimsatt also makes an explicit connection between levels and target systems, reifying levels and 
emphasizing their role in epistemic issues in mathematical modeling. Levels capture the “structural 
features . . . that dominate our world” (Wimsatt 2007, 194). The concept of level is fundamental 
in describing the complex ontology of the world. Entities that are found at a specific level, and the 
levels themselves, are seen as “real objects” (Wimsatt 2007, 195). Levels are characterized in terms 
of the entities that are found at each level, in terms of the relations (usually causal) between the 
entities, and their composition. Wimsatt says: 
Levels…are constituted by families of entities usually of comparable size and 
dynamical properties, which characteristically interact primarily with one another, 
and which, taken together, give an apparent rough closure over a range of 
phenomena and regularities. (Wimsatt 2007, 203–204) 
The size of the entities found at each level is an important factor in the characterization of the level 
themselves, as he agrees with Haldane’s (1926) claim that size plays an essential role in 
determining which physical processes are at play between the entities at a given level (Wimsatt 
2007, 207). For Wimsatt, size refers to spatial extension of the entities and object at each level, 
and their surface to volume ratio (Wimsatt 2007, 207). The size of the entities is related to their 
dynamical properties.  
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The importance of the dynamical processes in characterizing a level of organization implies 
that time also plays a very important role in determining levels (Wimsatt 2007, 216). “Closure,” 
in the quotation above, means that a theory (or class of models) aimed at describing one level can 
successfully describe all the entities that arise at that level. In this context, entities at a level and 
their interactions can be interpreted as target systems: entities or phenomena the properties of 
which can be measured and recognized at a particular level constitute the target system for which 
models are built in order to describe the dynamics of such entities or phenomena.  
5.2.3 Mitchell on Levels 
Mitchell (2003, 2009) talks about levels indirectly in her discussions of the metaphysical 
considerations in and epistemological issues of building models of a complex world. Her main 
goal is to provide a model of scientific enterprise that involves a “critical pluralism” of models and 
perspectives (Mitchell 2003, 4). Critical pluralism can be understood on one hand as an ontological 
pluralism: for one target system different models of aspects of properties of the target system can 
be formulated, and they all capture relevant processes of the target system. None of these models 
is the preferred one.  
Mitchell is criticizing an assumption Kim’s (1999) account of reductionism and emergence 
is committed to, namely that there is a preferred, fundamental level of description. She says: 
What the philosophical arguments that assume unique, complete representations 
and a privileged level and straightforward mappings from one level to another miss 
entirely is how is the property at the higher level is produced, and what are the 
difference among the many kinds of relationships between higher- and lower-level 
properties that occur in nature? (Mitchell 2009, 32) 
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Levels, on Mitchell’s account, are stable, material levels of organization, where higher levels are 
composed of lower levels, and (mostly) present a higher degree of complexity depending to the 
nature of the interaction of the lower level parts (such as positive or negative feedbacks, nonlinear 
interactions, etc.). Levels form a “hierarchy of multiple levels of organizations in biological 
systems” (Mitchell 2009, 21). An individual flying starling, for example, is a lower level 
component of a flock of starlings that moves in organized and complex patterns.  
Mitchell’s discussion is framed in terms of the debate about reduction and emergence. 
While I do not intend to engage with this debate, there are several important points about models, 
representation, and their relation to levels that emerge from Mitchell’s analysis. Requiring unique, 
complete representations is not reasonable, as representations are partial by nature (Mitchell 2009, 
31). The partiality of representations is tied to the existence of levels of organizations: complex 
phenomena have properties that do not exist at the lower level, and such properties cannot be 
predicted by lower levels. 
While Mitchell does not explicitly connect levels and phenomena (as a matter of fact, she 
seems to imply that a phenomenon can be described at many levels of complexity), it nevertheless 
seems reasonable to suggest that, in her framework, target systems are constrained by levels: stable 
properties or structures at different levels indicate what entities can be associated with particular 
properties or processes.56 
In this section I have described how Levins, Wimsatt, and Mitchell use the concept of level 
(of abstraction and of organization) to analyze the part of the world that is represented in models. 
All three philosophers agree that these levels of organization are an aspect of the world that allows 
                                                 
56 See Mitchell’s discussion of natural selection acting at different levels of complexity (2009, 
36) 
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scientists to identify entities and their properties in order to construct models. While Levins and 
Wimsatt do suggest that spatiotemporal scales play a role in defining scale, they do not develop 
the role in much depth. Further, Mitchell only refers to a hierarchical organization of levels, in 
which lower level entities make up the higher level entities. I suggest that in order to rigorously 
analyze the way scientists identify target systems, the notion of spatiotemporal scale has to be seen 
as central to an account that aims to clarify the constraints that are imposed by the world on models 
(or on scientists constructing models). The clearest connection between the concept of level and 
the role of scale related assumptions can be made for Levins’ account. In the next section, I will 
argue for such a connection in general terms. 
5.3 LEVELS AS SPATIOTEMPORAL SCALES 
In the previous section, I have sketched how some philosophers have argued that nature presents 
scientists with various levels of organization, at which and across which various description of 
nature can be provided through models. The views on levels provided by these philosophers share 
some characteristics. These characteristics are that levels exist in the world and as a consequence 
they impose constraints on how target systems are identified for successful modeling. Further, 
these levels are organized in terms of complexity for Mitchell, and (at least partially) in terms of 
scales for Levins and Wimsatt. I suggest that focusing on the role that spatiotemporal scales play 
for identifying target systems can provide a more accurate analysis of what philosophers have 
called “levels” and the role they play in model building. 
As has emerged from the examples discussed in this dissertation, processes are described 
in terms of stable patterns that are observed in the world, and patterns are easily identifiable when 
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they occur at characteristic spatiotemporal scales. Scientists associate target systems with 
processes that occur at these scales, such as tsunamis, hurricanes, or the daily migration of zoo-
plankton from depths to the sea surface (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). The identification of target 
systems involves identifying the characteristic scales at which patterns can be observed, and the 
scale existence and scale separation assumptions are important tools used in this process of 
identification. In addition, scientist have to define properties that are associated with a measurable 
quantity (e.g. motion and kinetic energy or population density and biomass variability), and they 
have to detect the signal of the pattern despite “the contamination of the other parts of the spectrum” 
(Stommel 1963, 573). 
This is where the notion of level can be clarified by the analysis of the role of the scale 
related assumptions that I have provided in the previous chapters: levels can be clearly 
individuated when there is enough scale separation that the pattern can be distinguished from the 
noise coming from other scales. The constraining role of the world that philosophers have 
attributed to levels comes from spatiotemporal scales. On the other hand, when many 
spatiotemporal scales interact, target systems are harder to identify, and pragmatic components 
dominate the target identification process. In this perspective on modeling, the patterns occurring 
at characteristic spatiotemporal scales are the aspect of the world constraining the creative aspect 
of modeling in science.  Scale separation of various processes can be seen in Figure 1.1 and Figure 
1.2. Peaks of the relevant quantities of interest (biomass variability, kinetic energy) at various 
spatiotemporal scales correspond to processes that can be isolated from their environment. The 
assumption that systems can be isolated––that one can appeal to scale separation to identify the 
system––is an idealization. There will always be some interaction across these scales, even if 
modeling a system involves setting up boundaries for the system. 
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This characterization of levels also gives force to Mitchell’s analysis of levels discussed in 
section 5.2.3: philosophical arguments that assume a unique, complete representation of the world 
and that there is a privileged level of description are misguided. They miss how properties at 
different levels are related to one another, and this is a very important aspect of scientific practice: 
when scientists isolate phenomena at their characteristic scales, they only focus on the scale of 
interest. The privileged level is only the level at which the phenomenon of interest is identified 
and modeled. 
As mentioned above, the process of identifying characteristic scales can be tricky where 
phenomena that occur on different scales interact and when phenomena have components 
occurring at many scales. See, for example, the spatiotemporal scales of tidal terms and 
meteorological effects in Figure 1.2. These two processes occur at overlapping temporal and 
spatial scales, which means some systems in this range will show properties that are a combination 
of both tidal terms and meteorological effects57. The mesoscale, described by Emanuel (1986)––
see section 1.3––, also presents the scientists with similar problems: a smooth energy spectrum 
might mean either that phenomena occurring at different but contiguous scales interact, and that 
phenomena could be identified but it is hard to do so, or it might mean that there are no phenomena 
of interest at all. In this case, pragmatic considerations are at the forefront of the identification of 
phenomena at particular scales and the modeling process. From a theoretical perspective, the 
validity of the scale separation assumption means that these processes can be described in terms 
of stabilities of the system, i.e. in terms of those factors that restore the system’s balance of forces. 
                                                 
57 Floods can be the effect of the interactions of phenomena at different scales. A case from 
meteorology that occurs rather frequently is the combination of the action of winds 
(meteorological effects) and supermoon tide (when tidal terms are stronger due to the closeness 
of the moon to the earth) on the height of the ocean surface. 
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Once the system can be identified and isolated from its environment, modeling the system involves 
identifying direct variables, time-varying parameters and constant parameters. These elements 
describe and quantify the patterns - turning them from observations into models of target systems.    
The use of the scale related assumptions indicates an ontological commitment to target 
system as processes confined to characteristic spatiotemporal scales.  This ontological 
commitment drives the epistemic consequences of the use of the scale existence and scale 
separation assumptions. As I have argued in chapter 4, the use of these assumptions in constructing 
models constrains the predictive ability of the model and the structural uncertainty associated with 
such predictions. Since patterns arise at characteristic spatial and temporal scales, the predictive 
ability of the model will only work on the sales at which these patterns arise (i.e. the model for this 
pattern will not be able to provide predictions on longer or shorter temporal scales, or finer or 
coarser spatial scales, mainly because these scales are outside of the scope of the model)58. Further, 
if scientists want to generate predictions for phenomena on longer time scales and/or finer spatial 
scales (these are the challenges that climate scientists are facing today with general circulation 
models), then there needs to be an integration of systems and their interaction across the scales of 
interest. 
These points imply that identifying systems at their characteristic spatiotemporal scales is 
central for both qualitative understanding of and quantitative predictions from models 59 . 
Understanding how target system are isolated from their environment and the way models capture 
                                                 
58 This statement agrees with Mitchell's claim that a characteristic of emergence is that the 
emergent patterns are not predictable from its components at lower levels taken individually 
(2009, 35). It must be noted that this unpredictability also goes the other way around: the 
behavior of the parts, if taken in isolation, cannot be predicted from the behavior of the whole. 
59 A similar point has been made by Potochnik and McGill (2012). While I do not agree with 
their criticism of the literature on levels, I do agree with the general positive argument about  
spatiotemporal scales. 
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variables of interest at their characteristic scales is therefore at the center of the modeling practice. 
These points further support the arguments presented in chapter 2 that scale assumptions are 
idealizing while also being empirical. 
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have argued that by taking the perspective of the identification of target systems, 
“levels” can be best understood in terms of spatiotemporal scales at which characteristic patterns 
are observed and associated with phenomena. I have analyzed the views of Levins, Wimsatt and 
Mitchell, and showed that their characterization of levels is compatible with the account I have 
given of the role of the scale assumptions. These assumptions are abstracting tools that scientists 
use to individuate phenomena, and as such they characterize levels in Levins’ sense. Wimsatt, on 
the other hand, characterizes levels as capturing dominant structural features in the world. He 
explicitly makes the connection between these dominant structures of the world and the “size” of 
these structures, making the connection between the role of the scale assumptions and levels 
particularly clear. Mitchell, on the other hand, argues for an important feature of levels that is also 
characteristic of the assumptions about scales: there is no privileged level and the “mappings” 
between levels are not at all straightforward. This is in line with my argument that details that are 
not relevant for modeling phenomena at their characteristic scales are ignored during the modeling 
process and given the complex nature of this process and of the world itself, adding those details 
back in is not easy at all. I have especially argued for this point in chapter 4: climate scientists face 
considerable difficulties and can introduce structural uncertainty in their models when they 
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downscale their models, which is equivalent to “adding more details” about phenomena at lower 
levels. Focusing on assumptions about scales can therefore provide a characterization of levels that 
is true to modeling practice and connects some of the most influential arguments in the literature 
on levels. 
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6.0 CONCLUSION 
Modelers don’t aim at obtaining a total description of the world, but rather partial representations 
of the world through models. The general philosophical question that is asked in this context is 
how these partial representations can produce reliable knowledge about the world. In particular, 
philosophers have asked how reliable knowledge can be obtained despite the fact that abstractions 
and idealizations, usually thought of as distortions of the world, are introduced in scientific models.  
In this dissertation I have argued that an important that scientists use in their representations 
are assumptions about the scale at which phenomena occur and the scale related conditions that 
allow scientists to treat phenomena as separate from one another. Assumptions about 
spatiotemporal scales play an important role in determining what counts as a target system: in 
chapter 2 I argued that these assumptions are ineliminable abstracting and idealizing assumptions. 
These assumptions are ineliminable as they play an essential role in determining what counts as a 
phenomenon, and removing these assumptions would imply that the scientists are not representing 
the intended phenomenon in their models. Removing such assumptions, would imply that 
scientists changing the level at which phenomena are being modeled, given the relation between 
scale assumptions and levels illustrated in chapter 5. The empirical––and sometimes normative––
justification for the use of these assumptions allows scientists to assess the reliability of the 
representation of a phenomenon, as I argued in chapter 4. When such justifications are absent, we 
have what is called in the literature “structural uncertainty”. This is uncertainty about whether the 
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structure of a mathematical equation accurately reflects the intended phenomenon. Chapter 3 
provided an extended discussion of the role of scale in the individuation of phenomena both from 
theoretical principles––the Arakawa and Schubert parametrization scheme discussed in section 
3.3––, and from data––the identification of ENSO discussed in section 3.2. 
My approach has been to focus on an aspect of scientific practice that is at the heart of 
scientific modeling, namely the identification of target systems. This approach distinguishes itself 
from traditional philosophical discussions of models, where typical questions focus on how models 
can provide reliable knowledge of the world despite their being idealizing and abstracting. I have 
focused on how relevant variables and parameters for the target system are chosen. This approach 
has allowed me to argue that the scale assumptions used in choosing relevant variables and 
parameters are necessarily idealizing and abstracting. Because these assumptions are ineliminable, 
it is in virtue of these idealizations and abstractions that scientists can obtain reliable partial 
representations of the worlds––the models of phenomena.  
I have also contributed to the conversation about the distinction between data, phenomena 
and theory that had been sketched by Bogen and Woodward (1988) and Woodward (2011). In 
particular, I have taken their distinction to be the first stepping stone needed in discussing the 
identification of targets and the role of scale related assumptions therein. In this dissertation, I 
showed that the relation between spatiotemporal scales and relevant properties of the system is a 
first important step in analyzing how phenomena are isolated from the rest of the world, both from 
observations and from theory.  
The empirical nature of the assumptions can further inform us about the nature of the 
phenomena that these assumptions help identify. Spatiotemporal scales are constraints on the kind 
of regularities that can be identified. As Levin says (Levin 1992, 1947), scientists can move from 
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observing irregular patterns at one scale to regular patterns at other scales, and these regular 
patterns allow for the kind of generalizations that allow for insight into the behavior of phenomena 
in the world. Phenomena are therefore not just the product of the modeler’s purpose or some 
arbitrary normative judgment. Phenomena are stable patterns in the world. The patterns in the 
world are identifiable at different spatiotemporal scales. By taking the perspective of target system 
identification, “levels” can be best understood in terms of spatiotemporal scales at which 
characteristic patterns are observed and associated with phenomena. In other words, phenomena 
present themselves at different scales, rather than different “levels” as often described in the 
literature.  
Depending on the scale a scientist is interested in, different kinds of detail will need to be 
included in the model. For example, modeling a mesoscale hurricane will not require that the small 
scale details of the molecules that the hurricane is made out of be included in the model––and in 
some cases not even the details of the single clouds need to be included in such a model: the scale 
separation assumption in this case guides scientists in determining when such details need to be 
included or can be excluded. 
This role of assumptions about scales in identifying phenomena is also an important 
indicator of when structural uncertainty––uncertainty about whether the model accurately 
represents a phenomenon––can arise in climate science. When scientists are not justified in leaving 
out or including certain details from the world in their descriptions of phenomena, then this 
uncertainty arises.  
These conclusions show that studying the process of target system identification is an 
approach that is not without interest for philosophers of science. This study in fact not only 
highlights what kind of assumptions are introduced when identifying phenomena and building 
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models, but it also provides insight into the nature of models and their relation to the world. Models 
are in fact constrained by normative assumptions and the purposes of modelers, but they are also 
importantly constrained by the patterns that arise at different scales. This constraint is embodied 
by the use of the scale existence and scale separation assumptions in scientific modeling. The 
process of identifying target systems is therefore not a process that is beyond the scope of 
philosophical analysis, but rather a process that can provide important insight both in classic and 
emerging discussions in the philosophy of science.  
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